SEPARATION OF POWERS AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW
RACHEL E. BARKOW
Scholars have written volumes about the separation of powers, but they have focused
on the administrative state and have wholly ignored the criminal state. Judges, too, have
failed to distinguish criminal from administrative matters. So, the conventional wisdom has
been that whatever theory works for the administrative state should work for anything else,
including crime. And because most scholars and judges have supported a flexible or
functional approach to separation of powers in the regulatory sphere, they have failed to
see a problem with the functional approach when it comes to criminal matters. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has been even more permissive of blending of powers in the criminal context
than it has in cases involving non-penal laws.
This Article shows why the existing functional approach to separation of powers in
criminal matters cannot be squared with constitutional theory or sound institutional design.
It explains that there are crucial differences between administrative and criminal matters
when it comes to the separation of powers. Maintaining the separation of powers in
criminal matters has strong roots in the Constitution’s text and structure. Moreover, unlike
the administrative law context, where agencies must adhere to the structural and procedural
protections of the Administrative Procedure Act and their decisions are subject to judicial
review and political oversight, the government faces almost no institutional checks when it
proceeds criminally. The only safeguards come from the individual rights provisions of the
Constitution, but those act as poor safeguards against structural abuses and inequities. The
current arrangement therefore takes the worst possible approach to separation of powers in
the criminal context. The protection provided by the separation of powers is weakened, but
nothing takes its place. As a result, the potential for government abuse is, perversely,
greater in criminal proceedings than in regulatory matters. This Article therefore
advocates more stringent enforcement of the separation of powers in criminal cases, where
it is most needed. This approach would lead to different outcomes in the Court’s major
separation of powers cases in criminal law and to a rethinking of its acceptance of plea
bargaining.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a familiar premise that the Constitution separates legislative,
executive, and judicial power to prevent tyranny and protect liberty.1 By
preventing any one branch from accumulating too much authority, the
separation of powers aims “not to promote efficiency but to preclude the
exercise of arbitrary power.”2 The price of separation is that it makes it
more difficult for the federal government to act – whether for good or bad
purposes.3
The rise of the administrative state put a spotlight on this cost of
separation of powers. New Dealers in favor of a more efficient and active
federal government argued for a relaxation of the division of powers to
allow agencies to combine government functions to address social and
economic ills.4 Instead of relying on separated powers as the primary
means of protection against government abuse, they proposed other checks
1

As James Madison declared in the Federalist Papers:
“The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands,
whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
2
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Burt Neuborne
colorfully puts it this way: “[T]he principle of ‘negative separation’ views government
power as a bomb so potent that no single organ can be trusted with the formula. . . .Negative
separation argues that the functions of government be carefully labeled and rigorously
parceled out to distinct governmental bodies as a prophylactic against threats to individual
liberty.” Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the
United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 372 (1982).
3
See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 604
(1969) (observing that the separation of powers “was designed to provide for the safety and
ease of the people, since ‘there will be more obstructions interposed’ against errors and
frauds in government”) (quoting John Dickinson); Philip B. Kurlan, The Rise and Fall of the
‘Doctrine’ of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REV. 592, 601 (1986) (“[T]he underlying,
if unstated, premise of all theories of separation seems to have been a minimalist
government.”).
4
As James Landis observed, “when government concerns itself with the stability of an
industry it is only intelligent realism for it to follow the industrial rather than the political
analogue. It vests the necessary powers with the administrative authority it creates, not too
greatly concerned with the extent to which such action does violence to the traditional
tripartite theory of government organization.” JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS 11-12 (1938).
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on state power. For example, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
requirements of notice and comment,5 of separation between law enforcers
and adjudicators,6 and of judicial review7 were designed to perform the
same functions as the Constitution’s separation of powers, without
hamstringing the government’s ability to respond rapidly to the Nation’s
problems.
The Supreme Court has accepted this compromise for administrative
agencies. While the Court has rejected some institutional arrangements
that stray too far from the constitutional separation of powers,8 it has
allowed considerable blending of executive, judicial, and legislative power
in agencies.9 At the same time, the Court has taken an expansive reading of
the APA to check government abuse.10
Scholars have filled volumes analyzing the relationship between the
separation of powers and the administrative state.11 Some have argued that
the Court’s allowance of blending promotes good government and accords
with the Constitution.12
Others have claimed that the existing
administrative state flouts the basic structure of the Constitution and that
the Court should not permit the arrangements it has.13
5

§553.
§§ 554, 556-57.
7
§706.
8
See infra TAN [27]-[38].
9
See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S 833 (1986)
(allowing agency adjudication of state law counterclaims); Humphrey’s Executor v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1935) (approving of the FTC’s “quasi-legislative” and “quasijudicial” powers, in addition to its executive powers); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (allowing legislative delegations as long as there is an
intelligible principle for the delegate to follow).
10
See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40-42 (1983) (providing hard look review of agency
rules); Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (requiring that agency
findings be supported by substantial evidence). See also Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S.
468 (1936) (requiring agency decisionmaker to hold hearing and consider evidence
presented).
11
For a small sampling of this vast literature, see Steven G. Calabresi and Joan L.
Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1994); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2245 (2001); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996); Peter L. Strauss,
The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); Peter H. Aranson, et al., A Theory of
Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER
WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION
(1993); Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 775 (1999).
12
See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); Harold Bruff,
Presidential Powers and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451 (1979).
13
See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna Prakash, The President’s Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel
6
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What has been completely overlooked in both the scholarly literature
and the Supreme Court’s decisions is what the separation of powers
requires when the government proceeds in a criminal action. Criminal law
cases could be viewed in one of three ways. One approach would be to
treat separation of powers questions in criminal cases no differently than
they are treated in administrative law cases. Just as in the administrative
law context, some blending of powers would be permitted to allow the
federal government to respond more readily to criminal matters. At the
same time, and again following the administrative law model, other checks
should take the place of the constitutional separation of powers to ensure
that the government does not abuse its power.
A second alternative would be to distinguish criminal law cases from
administrative law cases. Because state power is at its apex in the criminal
context and the consequences of abuse are so high – an individual could
lose his or her liberty or even life – this view would require strict adherence
to separation of powers to make sure that the state acts appropriately
against an individual. Under this approach, then, the need for government
flexibility and expediency may justify blending when the government
proceeds civilly, but not when it uses its criminal powers.
Current law follows a third way. Criminal cases are not distinguished
from administrative law cases, so the separation of powers is often relaxed
to allow a blending of powers when the government claims it is necessary
in the name of expediency.14 Indeed, the Court has been even more
permissive in the criminal context than it has in cases involving non-penal
laws.15 But unlike the administrative law context, where agencies must
adhere to the structural and process protections of the APA and their
decisions are subject to judicial review, the government faces almost no
institutional checks when it proceeds criminally. The only safeguards
come from the individual rights provisions of the Constitution, but those
act as poor safeguards against structural abuses and inequities.
The current arrangement therefore takes the worst possible approach
to separation of powers in the criminal law. The protection provided by the
separation of powers is relaxed, but nothing takes its place. As a result, the
potential for government abuse is, ironically, higher in the criminal context
than in other regulatory spheres.
This perverse state of affairs has been overlooked in the literature
because scholars have failed to treat criminal law as a separate category for
analysis. Instead, questions involving the oversight of the administrative
and regulatory state have tended to dominate the discussion of separation of
Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1988), Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise and the
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994); Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional
Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 357 (1990); Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on
Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313 (1989).
14
See infra Part I, IV.
15
See infra Part I.
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powers.16 So, the conventional wisdom has been that whatever theory
works for the administrative state should work for anything else, too. And
since most scholars have supported a flexible or functional approach to
separation of powers in the regulatory sphere, they have failed to see a
problem with that same approach when it comes to criminal matters.17
This Article breaks from that tradition and argues that the existing
approach to separation of powers in criminal matters cannot be squared
with constitutional theory or sound institutional design. Although the
administrative state has structural and process protections that can justify
some flexibility in the separation of powers, those checks are absent in the
criminal context. And in their absence, it is critically important to maintain
a strict division of powers.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the Supreme
Court’s treatment of separation of powers claims, with particular emphasis
on the criminal cases. As Part I explains, the Court does not employ a
stricter test of separation of powers for criminal law cases than for
administrative law cases. Just the opposite, the Court has allowed a greater
relaxation of the separation of powers in its criminal cases.
Part II critiques the existing approach to separation of powers. As Part
II explains, there are two key arguments for being more vigilant in
protecting the separation of powers when the state proceeds in a criminal
action. First, as a matter of traditional constitutional interpretation, a strict
separation of powers in criminal law matters has a stronger textual and
historical pedigree than it does in other contexts.
The Constitution
explicitly confronts the dangers of an abusive state in the context of
criminal proceedings in several textual provisions that reflect a strict
division of authority among the three branches and that give each branch a
strong check on the others in criminal proceedings.18 Indeed, convictions
require all three branches to agree, as well as approval of the jury. In
contrast, most other questions of separation of powers arise in
administrative law contexts that the Constitution does not explicitly
address.19 Similarly, while the Framers did not confront the question of
16
Indeed, because administrative state questions have been the prototype, most scholars
have addressed the question of separation of powers as a critical inquiry for administrative
law. Thus, constitutional separation of powers is standard fare in administrative law
textbooks and classes.
17
See, e.g., Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison
v. Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069 (1990); Neal Devins, Congressional
Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review, A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169
(2001); Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); William V. Luneburg, Civic Republicanism, The First
Amendment, and Executive Branch Policymaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 367 (2001).
18
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; infra Part II.A.
19
See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
545 (2000) (noting that “[a]gencies can claim . . .only a dubious constitutional lineage”
because “the framers made no explicit provision for them, but instead divided power among
the legislative and judicial branches and a unitary executive”); JERRY MASHAW, GREED
CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE 107 (1997) (discussing the separation of powers challenges posed
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how to divide and balance government functions in light of the rapid
expansion of the Industrial Revolution and the rise of the administrative
state – the foundational premise for most functional theories of separation
of powers that allow a blending of functions to create a more efficient
government – they did have experience with the state’s use and abuse of
the criminal laws. Indeed, questions of state criminal power occupy a great
deal of the Constitution’s structure precisely because this was a danger of
which the Framers were well aware. They feared the tyranny of majorities
that would seek to oppress opponents through the criminal laws. They
therefore established a constitutional structure that separates power among
the branches and gives the judiciary (judges and juries) a particularly strong
role in enforcing that separation. The individual rights protection provided
by the separation of powers20 has no greater purchase than in cases
involving criminal defendants, for those were precisely the instances of
abuse at the forefront of the minds of the Framing generation. So while
there are strong arguments for accommodating the Constitution to changing
circumstances in the case of unanticipated administrative law questions,
those arguments are not as strong when it comes to matters of criminal law.
The second reason for maintaining a strict separation of powers when
the federal government uses its criminal power rests on functional
concerns. As Part II explains, the state poses no greater threat to individual
liberty than when it proceeds in a criminal action. Those proceedings, after
all, are the means by which the state assumes the power to remove liberty
and even life. Yet there are currently almost no institutional checks on
federal criminal power. First, federal prosecutors face no restrictions on
their power that are comparable to the complex code of conduct and
organizational design established by the APA. The federal agency
responsible for setting federal sentences, the United States Sentencing
Commission, likewise differs from virtually all other agencies because it
faces no judicial review of its sentencing rules and policies. In addition,
the political controls over governmental crime policy also tend to be
weaker than they are in the regulatory sphere. Those accused of crimes are
among the most politically anemic groups in the legislative process.
Criminal defendants do not coalesce into an organized group, and those
that represent their interests tend to be disorganized and weak political
forces. In contrast, powerful interests often lobby for more punitive laws.
The executive branch in particular has an incentive to push for tough laws
to encourage plea bargaining and cooperation. The politics of crime
definition and sentencing are therefore far more lopsided than in other
contexts associated with the administrative state where it is more common
to have groups on both sides of the issue that act to check government

by the administrative agency); Strauss, supra note __, at 604 (“the actual text of the
Constitution says little about the structure of the federal government beneath the apex”).
20
For an excellent discussion of how the separation of powers aims to serve individual
liberty, see Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513 (1991).
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abuse of power.21 Thus, in the very area where state power is most
threatening – when it can lock away someone for years and impose the
stigma of criminal punishment – institutional protections are currently at
their weakest. While the numerous trial protections for criminal defendants
aim to protect the interests of individuals, Part II explains why those rightsbased protections do little to control the systemic abuse that the separation
of powers regulates.
In light of the fundamental differences between criminal and
administrative matters discussed in Part II, Part III advocates a stricter test
for policing separation of powers claims in criminal cases than the
functional analysis currently employed by the Court. In the literature on
separation of powers, this is typically referred to as the “formalist”
approach to separation of powers, where legislative, executive, and judicial
powers are to be separated and novel arrangements that allow a blending of
function or a weakening of one branch’s power are disallowed. This is
typically contrasted with the “functional” approach, which allows a caseby-case inquiry to see if the particular relaxation of separation of powers in
a given case will result in inappropriate aggrandizement of one branch’s
power over another.
The view advanced here is not formalism for the sake of formalism,
however. Rather, as Part III explains, the argument for a formalist
approach in criminal case is grounded in functional reasons.22
The
problem with an analysis that looks at the facts and circumstances of each
case is that the long-term and systemic effects caused by blurring the lines
of authority in criminal cases might not be immediately apparent, whereas
the government’s need for a more streamlined process is obvious,
particularly to judges who directly bear the burden of more cases on their
criminal docket. And, because judges retain oversight of criminal trials,
judges might not think structural protections are necessary. Moreover,
because courts analyze separation of powers questions in regulatory
contexts where efficiency arguments often trump other claims, that general
attitude has spillover effects in criminal cases. Courts have become
accustomed to blending arrangements and overlook the key differences
between administrative and criminal matters described in Part II. Thus, a
formal rule makes the most sense to ensure that the separation of powers
and the liberty interests it protects are not undervalued.
Part IV explains that a shift to a formal analysis of separation of
powers would not merely change the result in cases in which the
government adopts an obviously novel approach to a criminal justice
problem. It would also affect the most important day-to-day practice in
criminal law today: plea bargaining. Although a full analysis of the
21

See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 723-30 (2005)
(comparing interest group dynamics of criminal sentencing with other regulatory contexts).
22
As Bill Eskridge observes, “you can have a functionalist argument for a formalist
punch line.” See William N. Eskridge, Relationships Between Formalism and
Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 26 (1998).
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separation of powers problems posed by plea bargaining is beyond the
scope of this Article, Part IV explains the fundamental difficulty that plea
bargaining poses. Specifically, plea bargaining allows prosecutors to put a
price on the defendant’s exercise of the judicial check, which Part II
explains is a key element in the separation of powers. Trials come at a
price – prosecutors threaten longer sentences – and most individual
defendants (even those who are innocent) are unwilling to take the chance
of losing at trial. As a result, there is a systemic failing in which
prosecutors make the key decisions in criminal matters without a judicial
check and without any of the structural and procedural protections that
govern other executive agencies.23 It is precisely this kind of unchecked
power that the separation of powers is designed to guard against.
I.

THE CURRENT APPROACH TO SEPARATION OF POWERS

The Supreme Court approaches separation of powers questions with
little regard for the substantive contexts in which they arise. Instead,
separation of powers cases can be categorized by the methodology that the
Court employs to decide the case. Formalism and functionalism are
shorthand labels for the two main interpretive strategies employed by the
Court in its separation of powers cases.24
The formalist approach to separation of powers is characterized by the
use of bright-line rules designed to keep each branch within its sphere of
power.25 Under this rationale, legislative power must rest with the
legislative branch, executive power must rest with the executive branch,
and judicial power must rest with the judicial branch. This methodology
therefore requires the Court to characterize what type of power is being
exercised and to ensure that the power is being exercised in the correct
branch of government and in compliance with any constitutional
requirements for that type of power. If a governmental arrangement fails
this test, it will not be upheld, even if it is an efficient or convenient
solution to a public policy problem.26
The Court’s decision in Chadha27 provides an illustration of this
analysis. The law at issue in Chadha allowed one house of Congress to
23
See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2117, 2120 (1998) (“for most defendants the primary adjudication they receive is, in
fact, an administrative decision by a state functionary, the prosecutor, who acts essentially in
an inquisitorial mode”).
24
Of course, these terms can have many meanings. For a description of “formalism”
and “functionalism” as those terms are used in the context of separation of powers, see
generally Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions – A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987).
25
See William N. Eskridge, Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21 (1998); Strauss, Formal
and Functional Approaches, supra note __, at 489.
26
See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 US 919, 958-59 (1983) (“[T]he Framers ranked other
values higher than efficiency.”).
27
462 US 919 (1983).
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veto an agency decision to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United
States. The Court first concluded that the veto power constituted
legislative power because it “had the purpose and effect of altering legal
rights, duties, and relations of persons.”28 The Court then reasoned that,
because the Constitution requires legislative power to be exercised
according to the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I,29
the one-House veto was unconstitutional.30
The Court used the same formalist methodology in several other cases.
In Bowsher, the Court considered legislation that vested power in the
Comptroller General to alter the federal budget in order to meet deficitreduction quotas.31 The Court determined that the law was unconstitutional
because the Comptroller General was exercising executive power but was
an agent of Congress because it was subject to legislative removal.32 The
alleged benefits the legislation would bring in terms of a balanced budget
were irrelevant to the Court’s formalist analysis. The Court was no more
sympathetic to these claims when they arose in the context of legislation
that gave the President the power to exercise a line-item veto over spending
and tax benefits, as the Court once again applied a formalist analysis.33 In
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority,34 the Court concluded that a
review board composed of Members of Congress that had veto power over
a local airport authority violated the separation of powers. In classic
formalist analysis, the Court reasoned that if the Board’s power was
executive, “the Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to
exercise it.”35 And, if the Board’s veto power was deemed legislative,
“Congress must exercise it in conformity with the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of Art. I, § 7.”36 Thus, regardless of whether the

28

Id. at 952.
U.S. CONST. Art I, §§ 1, 7
30
Justice Powell’s concurrence followed formalist reasoning to a different conclusion.
He determined that the one-House veto exercised in Chadha was an exercise of judicial
power, and as such it could not be exercised by Congress. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 960
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
31
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
32
Id. at 733-34.
33
Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998) (concluding that the President’s
cancellation power under the law amounted to the power to repeal the law, which the Court
held must conform to the procedures in Article I). As Justice Kennedy observed in his
concurring opinion, “[t]he Constitution’s structure requires a stability which transcends the
convenience of the moment.” Id. at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Court’s leading
formalist, Justice Scalia, dissented because he believed that the Line Item Veto Act did
comply with the procedures of Article I, and that the President’s power to cancel items
raised a delegation question, not an Article I question. Id. at 463-64 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). And he thought the delegation doctrine was flexible enough
to permit the President’s authority under the Act. Id. at 472.
34
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
35
Id. at 276.
36
Id.
29
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law promoted “workable government,”37 it violated the separation of
powers.38
The Court’s acceptance of modern administrative agencies poses the
greatest challenge to the formalist approach to separation of powers. It is
hard to square, for example, the Court’s acceptance of agency rulemaking
pursuant to a broad statutory delegation39 with the pronouncement in
Chadha that all legislative power must go through the procedures in Article
I.40 Agency rulemaking “alter[s] the legal rights, duties, and relations of
persons,” but it does need to pass both houses of Congress and obtain the
President’s approval. And because agencies exercise judicial and executive
power as well,41 they combine all three types of power in one actor42 – the
very danger the separation of powers aimed to avoid. The Court has shown
no indication that it intends to overthrow the administrative state, so it has
sidestepped the agency challenge to the separation of powers even in cases
employing formalist analysis. For example, it distinguished agency
rulemaking from the legislative veto in Chadha by noting that agency
rulemaking is merely “quasi-legislative” and is limited by the statute from
which the agency derives its authority.43 In other cases, the Court has
protected key aspects of the administrative state by distinguishing basic
agency functions from more novel government innovations.44 Thus, when
formalist analysis is employed, the Court distinguishes prototypical federal
administrative agencies without acknowledging that they themselves would
fail under the same reasoning.
37

Id.
A plurality of the Court also embraced formalist reasoning to strike down the
Bankruptcy Reform Act’s broad grant of jurisdiction to non-Article III judges. See Northern
Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). But a majority of the
Court ultimately rejected the approach of Northern Pipeline in Schor. Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), which struck down a congressional restriction on the President’s
power to remove a postmaster because he was an executive official, is another example of
formalism, but it was dramatically limited by three functionalist decisions: Humphrey’s
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349
(1958), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
39
See, e.g., American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 310-13
(1953).
40
Justice White observed in Chadha that the majority’s conclusion “that all legislativetype action must be enacted through the lawmaking process ignores that legislative authority
is routinely delegated to the Executive Branch, to the independent regulatory agencies, and
to private individuals and groups.” Chadha, 462 U.S. at 984 (White, J., dissenting).
41
See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932) (allowing agency
adjudication).
42
Strauss, supra note __, at 492 (noting that agencies “exercise[] all three of the
governmental functions the Constitution so carefully allocates among Congress, President,
and Court.”).
43
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16 (distinguishing legislative veto from agency rulemaking
because the latter is “quasi-legislative”). The quasi-legislative language comes from
Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 628 (referring to the powers of the Federal Trade
Commission as “quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial.”
44
See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 6770 (1982) (distinguishing prior cases upholding agency adjudications as involving public
rights and then rejecting bankruptcy law that vested authority in non-Article III tribunal to
decide adjudications involving private rights).
38
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In further recognition and acceptance of the administrative state, the
Court does not always employ a formalist methodology in its separation of
powers cases. Instead, the Court will engage in a functional analysis that
allows some mixing of power among the branches as long as one branch
does not aggrandize its power at the expense of another45 or otherwise
impede a branch from performing its core responsibilities.46 The Court’s
opinion in Schor47 provides an example of this methodology. Schor
involved a separation of powers challenge to the Commodity Exchange
Act, which allowed the Commodity Future Trading Commission to
adjudicate customer claims that brokers violated the terms of the Act and
broker counterclaims (including claims under state law) arising out of the
same transaction.48 The Supreme Court rejected the formalist argument
that jurisdiction over state law claims was judicial power that had to be
exercised by an Article III court. The Court “declined to adopt formalistic
and unbending rules” because “[a]lthough such rules might lend a greater
degree of coherence to this area of the law, they might also unduly constrict
Congress’ ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its
Article I powers.”49 Instead, the Court adopted a balancing test, in which it
weighed a number of factors to determine “the practical effect that the
congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the
federal judiciary.”50 The Court upheld the legislation at issue in Schor
because it concluded that the agency’s jurisdiction over the counterclaims
did not impermissibly intrude on the power of Article III courts.
Although the actual application of the functional test is contextspecific, the test itself is invoked as if it applies to all settings.51 When the
45
Commodity Future Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986) (“this
case raises no question of the aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of a
coordinate branch”).
46
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (noting that Court will strike
down laws that “either accrete to a single Branch powers more appropriately diffused
among separate Branches or that undermine the authority and independence of one or
another coordinate Branch”). Functionalists interpret the Constitution’s vesting clauses as
speaking only to the heads of each branch – Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court
– and granting flexibility in Congress to vest other governmental actors with combined
powers as long as the result does not interfere with the core functions of Congress, the
President, or the Supreme Court. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches, supra note
__, at 510-514.
47
478 U.S. 833 (1986).
48
Id. at 836-37.
49
Id. at 851.
50
Id. “Among the factors upon which we have focused are the extent to which the
‘essential attributes of judicial power’ are reserved to Article III courts, and conversely, the
extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers
normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and importance of the right to be
adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article
III. Id. (citations omitted).
51
In addition to Schor, the Court has applied a functional analysis in a case involving
the United States Sentencing Commission, the independent counsel statute, and even the
treatment of those labeled enemy combatants. See infra Part I.A. See also Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (rejecting a separation of
powers challenge to law vesting custody of Presidential papers in the Administrator of
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Court uses a formalist approach in a separation of powers case, it similarly
does not claim that it is employing formalism because a particular context
or setting demands it. Instead, the Court simply employs that type of
reasoning with little or no explanation as to why.52 The Court thus uses the
methodologies interchangeably and does not claim to alter its approach
depending on the substantive context.
Although the Court has not stated that a particular approach to
separation of powers makes sense in the context of criminal cases, in the
few cases in which such claims have come up,53 the Court rejected
formalist arguments and employed a functional analysis. Section A will
discuss in more detail the Supreme Court’s methodology in the major
criminal law cases raising separation of powers claims, and Section B will
conclude by analyzing why the Court employed a functional analysis in all
of the criminal cases while applying a formalist methodology in most of its
civil regulatory cases.

General Services after analyzing “the extent to which [the law] prevents the Executive
Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions”).
52
That is not to say that the Court has not provided arguments in support of the use of
formalism as a general matter. See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959 (“[W]e have not yet
found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the
carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.”). Scholars have been more
expansive in their functional reasons for taking a formalist approach. See, e.g., Larry
Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin’”: Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 530, 534-36 (1999) (arguing that formalism “solves the problems of coordination,
expertise, and efficiency,” and reduces error and decisionmaking costs); Thomas W. Merrill,
Toward a Principled Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
31, 31 (1998) (endorsing formalism for functionalist reasons); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE
CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 100-02 (1995) (criticizing a functional approach
because it “inherently guts the prophylactic nature of the separation-of-powers protections”
and offering pragmatic reasons for formalism as a better alternative). Indeed, Rick Pildes
“suspect[s] that formalists of all stripes, including the classical legal formalists, have always
defended formalism, surely at the level of ultimate justification, in terms of purported
desirable consequences.” Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607,
613 (1999).
53
More often than not, separation of powers questions are not raised at all in criminal
law cases, even among the lower courts. Instead, when constitutional issues come up in
criminal matters, they tend to be grounded in protections emanating from the Bill of Rights.
This is likely an outgrowth of the Warren Court’s jurisprudential reforms in criminal
procedure. Even as the Court has become more conservative, it has continued to regulate
criminal procedure, so claims are couched in those terms. In turn, constitutional criminal
law scholarship is also dominated by a rights-based focus. Bill Stuntz has been the most
persuasive voice arguing against the doctrine and the scholarship. He argues that the
Court’s procedural rights cases have been counterproductive and urges the Court to turn its
attention instead to substantive review of criminal laws and sentences under the 8th and the
14th Amendment. See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice at __
(draft on file with author); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 3-6 (1997). Although this Article looks to
constitutional structure instead of substantive review, it shares Professor Stuntz’s view that
the rights-based focus of constitutional law is incomplete.
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A.

The Separation of Powers in Criminal Cases

Of the Supreme Court’s major separation of powers cases, two
involved criminal proceedings.54 This section will discuss both of those
cases, Morrison v. Olsen55 and Mistretta v. United States,56 and also
address a recent case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,57 which touched on related
issues.
1.

The Independent Counsel

In the wake of Watergate, Congress passed the Ethics and Government
Act of 1978,58 which authorized the appointment of an impartial,
independent counsel to investigate and prosecute criminal conduct by highranking government officials. Pursuant to the Act, if the Attorney General
received information that was “sufficient to constitute grounds to
investigate” whether a person covered by the law committed a federal
crime, the Attorney General had to conduct a preliminary investigation.
The Attorney General was then obligated to apply to a special court, known
as the Special Division, for the appointment of an independent counsel
unless the Attorney General’s investigation yielded “no reasonable grounds
to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted.”59 The Act
also gave congressional committee members the authority to “request in
writing that the Attorney General apply for the appointment of an
independent counsel.”60 Although the Attorney General was not obligated
under the Act to file an application upon receiving such a request, the
Attorney General was required to respond to the committee members’
request within a specified time limit.61
Once appointed, the independent counsel remained in office until he or
she completed the investigation or prosecution62 unless the Attorney
General could show that the counsel should be removed for “good cause,
physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that
54
Although United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) involved a presidential
challenge to a subpoena issued as part of a criminal case, the separation of powers claim in
that case rested on the scope of the executive privilege more than it rested on the
relationship among branches. The Court’s discussion of separation of powers was quite
brief. See id. at 706-707 (concluding that the President’s claimed absolute privilege “as
against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a
generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic
discussions would upset the constitutional balance of ‘a workable government’ and gravely
impair the role of the courts under Art. III”).
55
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
56
488 U.S. 361 (1989).
57
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
58
Pub.L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867.
59
28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1).
60
Id. § 592(g)(1).
61
Id. §592 (g)(2).
62
The statute gave the Special Division the authority to find that the office of the
independent counsel should be terminated if “the investigation of all matters within the
prosecutorial jurisdiction of such independent counsel . . . .have been completed or so
substantially completed that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to
complete such investigations and prosecutions.” 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2).
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substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel’s
duties.”63 Although the good cause provision limited the executive
branch’s control over the independent counsel, the Act employed other
mechanisms to create accountability for the independent counsel’s actions.
Congressional committees were given jurisdiction to oversee the conduct of
the independent counsel,64 and the counsel was required to inform the
House of Representative of “substantial and credible information . . . that
may constitute grounds for impeachment.”65
If the Court employed the same formalist methodology it used in
Bowsher, it would have found the independent counsel law
unconstitutional. Because investigating and prosecuting crime is an
executive power,66 Congress’ restriction of the President’s removal
authority for good cause would be unlawful under formalist reasoning.
Indeed, that was the governing precedent at the time of Morrison. Under
the Court’s decisions in Myers67 and Humphrey’s Executor,68 Congress
could not place restrictions on the President’s power to remove purely
executive officials. The Court, however, rejected this approach and relaxed
the separation of powers standard in the context of a criminal case. It
essentially overruled Myers and Humphrey’s69 and distinguished Bowsher
63

Id. §596(a)(1).
Id.§ 595(a)(1).
65
Id. § 595(c).
66
There is some debate in the literature over the history of prosecution and whether it
was an exclusive province of the executive branch. For example, some scholars point out
that at the time of the Framing and for some time thereafter, state and private prosecutors
initiated prosecutions and prosecutors were often associated with the judicial branch. See,
e.g., Harold J. Krent, Addressing the Constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Statute:
Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U.
L. REV. 275, 286-296 (1989) (commenting on the role of private and state prosecutors);
Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial
Review, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 204 (1990) (same); William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of
the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 502 (1989)
(arguing that the history suggests that prosecution should be seen as both executive and
judicial in nature); Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor in Historical Context, 39
PROSECUTOR 28, 30 (June 2005) (arguing that early prosecutors were “minor figure[s]”and
“primarily judicial and only quasi-executive”). Saikrishna B. Prakash disputes this
historical claim and argues that the historical evidence shows that the President retained
control over federal prosecutions. Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1701, 1729-1751 (2005); see also Krent, supra, at 296 (discussing evidence
that non-federal prosecutors could start prosecutions, but noting that federal prosecutors
retained the discretion to drop the cases). Regardless of the historical background, the
Supreme Court in Morrison conceded that prosecution was an executive power. Morrison,
487 U.S. at 691. Moreover, as discussed infra Part II.A, it is critical to maintain separation
between judicial and executive power because the judiciary supplies a critical check on
prosecutions. See also Prakash, supra, at 1755 (“To regard prosecution as part of the
judicial power in any way, shape, or form, is to nullify one of the Constitution’s central
features – its judicial safeguard against prosecutorial overreach.”); Jacoby, supra note __, at
32 (noting that, by the Civil War, the public “began to ask for a clear and distinct separation
between the duties and powers of the prosecutor and those of the courts”).
67
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
68
295 U.S. 602 (1935).
69
Elizabeth Magill argues that, although Morrison created “an important change in the
doctrine,” in some sense the outcome was already accepted by Humphrey’s Executor
64
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as involving an attempt by Congress to aggrandize its own power by
gaining a role in removing an executive official.70 The Court opted instead
for a balancing test that asked “whether the removal restrictions are of such
a nature that they impede the President’s ability to perform his
constitutional duty.”71 Applying that test, the Court “simply [did] not see
how the President’s need to control the exercise of [the independent
counsel’s] discretion is so central to the functioning of the Executive
Branch as to require as a matter of constitutional law that the counsel be
terminable at will by the President.”72
Justice Scalia alone dissented, largely on formalist grounds. He said
the Act was unconstitutional because criminal prosecutions and
investigations constituted the exercise of purely executive power, and the
Act deprived the President “of exclusive control over the exercise of that
power.”73 He rejected the Court’s view that it was up to the Court to
decide “how much of the purely executive powers of government must be
within the full control of the President.”74
But Justice Scalia also offered some functional reasons for his
formalist conclusion. He believed that the threshold for requiring
appointment of an independent counsel was inappropriately low. In his
view, it would be a rare case in which there were no reasonable grounds to
believe further investigation would be warranted, particularly if Members
of Congress assembled facts in favor of further investigation.75 The Act
created further undue political pressure for appointment of an independent
counsel because of the Act’s provisions for congressional oversight.76
“[H]ow easy it is,” he observed, “for one of the President’s political foes
outside of Congress simply to trigger a debilitating criminal investigation
of the Chief Executive under this law.”77 Without executive accountability,
the Act removed the political check against prosecutorial abuse.78 It also
removed institutional checks against prosecutorial abuse, such as having
the perspective of other cases and targets to ensure that the laws are fairly
applied.79 Justice Scalia also offered a functional reason for rejecting
because independent agencies often perform some purely executive functions. Thus, Magill
contends that “Morrison admitted what had been true in practice.” M. Elizabeth Magill, The
Rehnquist Court: The Revolution that Wasn’t, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 47, 52 (2004). It remains
noteworthy that the Court chose a criminal case as the setting in which to abandon the stated
test, even if it was somewhat fictional.
70
487 U.S. at 686.
71
Id. at 691.
72
Id. at 691-92.
73
Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74
Id. at 709.
75
Id. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76
“The context of this statute is acrid with the smell of threatened impeachment.” Id.
77
Id. at 713.
78
Id. at 728.
79
Justice Scalia quoted from an amicus brief filed by former Attorneys General who
noted that the “institutional environment of the Independent Counsel” is worrisome –
“specifically her isolation from the Executive Branch and the internal checks and balances it
supplies.” Id. at 731 (quoting Brief for Edward H. Levi, Griffin B. Bell, and William
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functional tests for separation of powers claims as a general matter. He
argued that the Court’s balancing test was not a justiciable standard and
lacked predictability.80
The Court underestimated the functional arguments raised by Justice
Scalia, presumably because they may have seemed too remote and looked
like nothing more than guesses about how bad political actors might use
this new tool. In contrast, the value of the independent counsel statute was
readily apparent – the statute was designed to make prosecuting corrupt
government officials easier and without a worry about conflict of interest.
Weighing the removal of corrupt government officials against vague
notions of political abuse made it seem like an easy case to most members
of the Court.
2.

The Sentencing Commission

In Mistretta v. United States, the Court faced the question of whether
Congress could delegate the authority to establish sentencing laws to an
independent commission ostensibly housed in the judicial branch81 and
containing federal judges as members. The Court saw no trouble with the
delegation, emphasizing that delegation jurisprudence “has been drive by a
practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete
with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot
do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives.”82 It was, in the Court’s view “especially appropriate” that
Congress delegated the “intricate, labor-intensive task” of establishing
guidelines to the Commission.83 Nor was the Court troubled by the fact
that an agency placed in the judicial branch would exercise “significantly
political” activity.84 The Court emphasized that its “separation-of-powers
analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activity” but instead focuses on
the “practical consequences” of the government scheme at issue.85 Thus, it
did not matter to the Court that a judicial branch agency would be
exercising rulemaking power.86
Justice Scalia again provided the lone dissent. Although he agreed
with the majority that the Act provided an intelligible principle for
French Smith as Amici Curiae 11). The brief listed the dangers of “too narrow a focus, of
the loss of perspective, of preoccupation with the pursuit of one alleged suspect to the
exclusion of other interests.” Id. For a discussion of how escalation theory would have
predicted that the independent counsel law would create incentives for prosecutors to
continue on failing courses of action, see Jerry Ross, Avoiding Captain Ahabs: Lessons from
the Office of the Independent Counsel, 35 ADMIN. & SOC. 334 (2003).
80
Id. at 711-12, 733.
81
Although Congress labeled the Sentencing Commission a judicial branch agency, its
relationship to the judiciary is tenuous. Although judges serve as members, the agency is
not under the control of a judicial body nor does it decide cases or controversies.
82
488 U.S. at 372.
83
Id. at 379.
84
Id. at 393.
85
Id.
86
The Court also rejected the petitioner’s claim that the Act’s requirement that judges
serve on the Commission compromised the integrity of the judiciary. See id. at 397-404.
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purposes of the delegation doctrine, he objected to the delegation of
lawmaking authority to an agency “created by Congress to exercise no
governmental power other than the making of laws.”87 He relied on
formalist reasoning, arguing that while agencies could engage in
rulemaking as an incidental power to their enforcement responsibilities and
courts could do so as part of their judicial functions, allowing an agency
solely to pass rules would cross the constitutional line because there is no
pretense that such an agency is doing anything other than exercising
legislative power. He reasoned that the Court accepted the delegation of
lawmaking power because it “inheres in most executive or judicial action,”
not because Congress is permitted to assign its responsibilities to someone
else.88 Because the Sentencing Commission had no other responsibilities
that altered legal rights other than making rules, Justice Scalia thought it
amounted to a “junior-varsity Congress” that did not fit anywhere within
the three-branch structure of the Constitution.
Aside from another attack on the Court’s use of balancing tests,89
Justice Scalia did not offer much in the way of functional arguments. And
the parties’ briefs likewise fell short on instrumental analysis. Faced with
abstract notions of separated powers for the sake of separated powers, it is
perhaps not surprising that most members of the Court sided with the
government’s claimed need for a commission to remedy the “shameful”
disparity and uncertainty that plagued the federal system’s prior sentencing
scheme.90
3.

Enemy Combatants

The case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld required the Court to decide what
process is due an American citizen who is captured on a foreign battlefield
and who has been detained by the government as an enemy combatant.91 It
is not, strictly speaking, a criminal case because the government was
asserting its war powers, not its criminal powers. But if the Court held that
87

Id. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
89
Id. at 426-27.
90
Id. at 366 (quoting legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act).
91
The government defined an enemy combatant as an individual who was “part of or
supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners in Afghanistan and who
engaged in an armed conflict against the United States there.” 124 S.Ct. at 2639 (internal
quotations omitted).
Hamdi also raised the question of whether Congress gave the President the authority to
detain citizen enemy combatants pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force,
115 Stat. 224, or whether the detention violated 18 U.S.C. § 4001, which provides that “[n]o
citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an
Act of Congress.” The plurality concluded that the AUMF gave the President the necessary
authority to detain Hamdi. 124 S.Ct. at 2639-40. Justice Thomas, in dissent, concluded that
the President had detention authority as part of his war powers. Id. at 2674 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter, in an opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg, disagreed that the
detention was authorized under the AUMF and concluded that the detention was forbidden
by § 4001(a). Id. at 2660 (Souter J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgment). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, concluded that the detention was
unlawful because the AUMF did not suspend the writ of habeas. Id. at 2671.
88
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the President lacked the authority to label a citizen an enemy combatant
and detain Hamdi on that basis, the executive branch would have to use its
criminal powers or Congress would have to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus to detain him. Thus, the case explored the line between the
President’s authority during wartime and the Constitution’s criminal
protections, as well as the scope of executive and judicial power to
determine that line. It therefore raises some of the same separation of
powers issues that arise in traditional administrative and criminal law cases.
The government alleged that Hamdi was affiliated with the Taliban in
Afghanistan and that his Taliban unit surrendered in a zone of active
combat.92 Because the United States was engaged in armed conflict with
the Taliban, the government argued that individuals associated with them
“were and continue to be enemy combatants” who could be lawfully
detained by the President pursuant to his war powers.93 The government
contended that separation of powers principles prevented federal courts
from inquiring further into Hamdi’s status as long as the government
provided “some evidence” that he was an enemy combatant.94
A majority of a fractured Court rejected the government’s “some
evidence” standard,95 though the Court was still highly deferential to the
government. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge96 balancing test from the
administrative law context,97 a majority of the Court concluded that a
citizen-detainee was entitled to “notice of the factual basis of his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”98 A plurality of the Court
cautioned, however, that “the exigencies of the circumstances may demand
that, aside from these core elements, enemy combatant proceedings may be
tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a
time of ongoing military conflict.”99 The plurality then noted that it would
be acceptable for the government to use hearsay evidence or to adopt a
presumption in favor of the government’s evidence.100 The plurality also
92

124 S.Ct. at 2637-38.
124 S.Ct. at 2637.
94
Id. at 2645. The government clarified that the some evidence standard did not allow
the court to weigh evidence, but merely to see if there was any evidence in the record to
support the government’s conclusion. Id.
95
Id .at 2650-51 (“reject[ing] the Government’s assertion that separation of powers
principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts” and noting that the “some
evidence” test is “inadequate”); id. at 2660 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with plurality that Hamdi deserved notice, the
opportunity on remand to offer evidence that he is not an enemy combatant, and the right to
counsel).
96
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
97
The Court employed the Mathews test on its own, as the parties did not couch their
arguments in those terms. 124 S.Ct. at 2683 n. 5 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (observing that the
parties did not “cite Mathews even once”).
98
Id. at 2648; id. at 2660 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment).
99
Id. at 2649.
100
Id.
93
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noted “the possibility that the standards we have articulated could be met
by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military
tribunal.”101 Thus, a majority of the Court – the plurality plus Justice
Thomas – heavily weighted the government’s claimed need for a
streamlined process as against Hamdi’s liberty interest.
Justice Scalia again employed a formalist analysis. In a dissent joined
by Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia noted that “freedom from indefinite
imprisonment at the will of the Executive” formed the core liberty interest
protected by the separation of powers.102 Because “[c]itizens aiding the
enemy have been treated [historically] as traitors subject to the criminal
process,” in Justice Scalia’s view it was “unthinkable that the Executive
could render otherwise criminal grounds for detention noncriminal merely
by disclaiming an intent to prosecute, or by asserting that it was
incapacitating dangerous offenders rather than punishing wrongdoing.”103
After looking at the Constitution’s text, the history of habeas, and writings
from the founding generation, he concluded that the government had only
one of two options if it wanted to detain Hamdi: either charge him with a
crime or, if the exigencies of war required it, suspend the writ of habeas
corpus.104 Justice Scalia concluded by criticizing the plurality’s willingness
to craft a different solution in the face of its conclusion that the
government’s existing procedures were inadequate and the government’s
claims for expediency. He said the plurality’s approach reflects a “Mr. Fix
It Mentality” that puts the unelected Court in the business of deciding what
works best instead of “decree[ing] the consequences, as far as individual
rights are concerned, of the other two branches’ actions and omissions.”105
Here, too, it seems relatively clear what animated the rest of the Court
to reject the Scalia formalist argument. The Court did not want to put the
government to the choice of suspending the writ or pursuing criminal
charges because it thought more flexibility was necessary for the
government to respond to the threat of terrorism. This was particularly true
when the individual being detained was captured on a battlefield, a
situation in which the Court must have thought the risk of innocence was
likely to be low and the government need for expediency particularly
high.106 A bright-line rule would not allow the same flexibility to adjust to
101
Id. at 2651. Justice Souter made clear that he did not agree with the plurality’s
resolution of these issues. Id. at 2660 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment).
102
Id. at 2661 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103
Id. at 2662.
104
Id. at 2660, 2665-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105
Id. at 2673.
106

In contrast, the Court seems to have reached a different conclusion when
faced with an alleged enemy combatant who is an American citizen captured in the
United States. In Padilla, where the alleged “enemy combatant” was an American citizen
taken into custody at O’Hare Airport, four Justices made clear that they would not allow the
Executive to proceed in the same way. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2729
(2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer). Those
votes, coupled with Justice Scalia’s in Hamdi, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2660
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the facts, but by adopting a functional approach that balances the interests
at stake, the Court allowed itself room to adjust the outcomes based on
factual variations it deemed significant.
B.

Criminal and Administrative Law Cases Compared

Although the Court has not decided many criminal law cases raising
separation of powers claims, they have followed the same pattern: the
Court has been highly receptive to functional arguments about the need for
government flexibility. This contrasts with the Court’s treatment of
separation of powers arguments raised outside of the criminal law context.
Although occasional cases, like Schor, employed functional analysis, most
of the other cases used formalist reasoning.107
Given the paucity of separation of powers cases generally and of
criminal cases raising such issues in particular, it is unwise to draw any
firm conclusions from the patterns in the Court’s cases. But the Court’s
rejection of formalist arguments in each of the criminal cases when it has
employed that methodology frequently in administrative law cases at least
merits further exploration. After all, one might expect the pattern to be just
the opposite. Because the threat to liberty when the state proceeds
criminally is greater than when it proceeds civilly, one might think the
Court would be particularly vigilant about enforcing the separation of
powers when cases involve criminal matters.108 What explains the opposite
result, where the Court embraces functionalism more readily in criminal
cases?
The explanation does not seem to rest on the Court’s belief that
criminal cases somehow deserve less protection.109 In none of the Court’s
criminal cases did the Court indicate that separation of powers concerns
were less pressing or otherwise addressed by other means. And it would be
difficult to imagine a line of reasoning that would lead the Court to believe
that criminal proceedings deserve less protection than civil proceedings.
The more likely possibility for the differential pattern is that the Court
simply failed to view Morrison, Mistretta, or Hamdi as criminal cases in
(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting), make five votes in favor of Padilla’s argument that the
executive cannot detain an citizen captured in the United States on the claim that he is an
enemy combatant.
107
See supra Part I.A.
108
That is, if the purpose of separation of powers is, as Rebecca Brown has argued, to
protect individual due process interests, there is a greater need for enforcement in the
context of criminal actions. See Brown, supra note __, at 1516 (arguing that “government
action that jeopardizes government process poses a concomitant danger to individual rights
and that the potential for such danger should be a significant factor in separation-of-powers
analysis”).
109
That would, in fact, be contrary to the Court’s demand for greater procedures in
criminal cases in other contexts. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970)
(not requiring the state to provide counsel in welfare termination proceedings) with Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963) (requiring the appointment of counsel in criminal
proceedings). See also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 211-12 (1969)
(arguing that there is a greater need for a judicial check over prosecutors than of other
administrative or executive functions).
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the classic sense. Morrison was not about run of the mill prosecutions, but
those involving crimes by government officials. Mistretta was not about
rules of criminal liability, but sentencing, and the Sentencing Commission
on the surface seemed to mirror traditional regulatory agencies. Hamdi,
too, was unique because it was about the executive’s power to respond to
terrorism. Each case, then, at least on the surface, seemed to be much more
about the scope of executive and agency power than about criminal power.
Thus, the Court seemingly viewed these cases through the lens of the
administrative state and its need for efficiency and flexibility.110 Indeed,
the opinions themselves suggest as much. In upholding the independent
counsel law, for example, the Court drew an explicit comparison to
“various federal agencies whose officers are covered by ‘good cause’
removal restrictions” and noted that they “exercise civil enforcement
powers that are analogous to the prosecutorial power.”111 Although Hamdi
was a case about Executive power in war time, it is telling that the Court
employed the due process paradigm from administrative law, Mathews v.
Eldridge, that is designed to take into account government claims for
efficiency.
The Court’s failure to focus on the criminal aspects of these cases
suggests that the Court did not view them as distinguishable from other
cases involving executive power. If true, that would mean there is no
clean split between administrative cases on the one hand and criminal cases
on the other, but just different treatment of different administrative law
cases.
Because the purpose of this Article is to challenge the view that
criminal and administrative law cases are indistinguishable for separation
of powers purposes, Part II will explore the critical distinctions between
these two areas. Once the differences between criminal power and
administrative power are explored, it will become clear that the Supreme
Court’s core separation of powers jurisprudence is almost completely
backwards: a functional analysis that allows greater blending of powers is
most troublesome in the context of criminal matters.

110

It is also interesting that Justice Breyer, perhaps the foremost defender of the
administrative state on the Court, tends to treat questions of criminal law structure and
design like all other agency questions and tends to side with views that give the executive
branch much flexibility. See e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
joining the majority); Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 569 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531,
2551 (2004). (Breyer, J., dissenting); United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 756, 802
(2005). (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part and dissenting in part).
111
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692 n.31.
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II. CRIME IS DIFFERENT
Perhaps because the Court does not divide its separation of powers
decisions along substantive lines,112 scholars likewise have failed to
disaggregate separation of powers questions based on subject matter.113
The unfortunate result is that the existing doctrine and literature neglects
important differences between criminal matters and civil regulatory actions.
This Part will explore these key distinctions to show the particular
importance of separation of powers protections in criminal matters.
Section A begins by exploring how the exercise of government
criminal power rests on a different constitutional foundation than
administrative power. The argument for strict separation of power when
the state uses its criminal powers has greater support in the Constitution’s
text, structure, and history. Section B explains the functional reasons for
greater enforcement of separated powers in the criminal context. The
agencies and individuals responsible for enforcing criminal laws are not
subject to the same structural protections that exist in the typical regulatory
context. The APA does not apply, and there is weak political oversight of
government overreaching. Section C rebuts the view that the individual
rights protections in the Bill of Rights provide an adequate replacement for
the separation of powers.
A.

Constitutional Foundations

The case for what might be called criminal law exceptionalism starts
with the text and structure of the Constitution itself. One of the animating
features of the Constitution is its preoccupation with the regulation of the
government’s criminal powers. Even before the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, the Constitution provided protection for the rights of those accused
of crimes through its structural provisions.
“The Framers were well acquainted with the danger of subjecting the
determination of the rights of one person to the ‘tyranny of shifting
majorities,’”114 and they were particularly focused on the dangers of
legislative encroachment of the judicial power over crime. Because the
112
Indeed, as many scholars have noted, the Court does not divide its cases along any
discernible lines. Instead, the Court proceeds on an ad hoc basis. See Brown, supra note
__, at 1517-18 and n.10 (citing those who criticize the lack of coherence in separation of
powers jurisprudence).
113
For example, scholars critical of the formalist approach do not differentiate among
categories and instead assume that a functional analysis is appropriate for all types of cases.
Similarly, scholars who support a formalist approach reject all of the functional cases, not
just a subset. See Brown, supra note __, at 1522 (noting that “[m]ost writers in the field
have proceeded by selecting the interpretive theory they consider superior [as between
formalism and functionalism], then evaluating each of the Court’s separation-of-powers
decisions against the template of that theory”). An exception is foreign affairs, which is
often treated as a separate category for purposes of separation of powers and constitutional
analysis more generally. See, e.g. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §
4-2, at 634; Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on FreeForm Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1249 (1995).
114
Chadha, 462 U.S at 961 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
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state could potentially go after any citizen in a criminal proceeding, the
normal course of politics should act as a threshold check on the passage of
laws that criminalize too much ordinary conduct.115 But that protection
will not work if political actors can single out the conduct of disfavored
minority groups and criminalize their conduct specifically.116
The Framers recognized that risk – and concomitantly, the temptation
for the legislature to engage in such behavior – so Article I establishes
express limits on the legislative exercise of judicial power.
First, it
prohibits bills of attainder, which would allow Congress to identify those
individuals affected by any given piece of legislation before passing it.117
As the Court noted in United States v. Brown,118 “the Bill of Attainder
Clause was intended not as a narrow, technical . . . prohibition, but rather as
an implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against
legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply – trial by
legislature.”119 The legislature lacks the impartiality of the judiciary, and if
the legislature had the power to single out individuals, that “might tempt it
to act as a judge in its own cause.”120 Second, Article I also aims to prevent
the legislature’s ability to target individuals for criminal punishment
through its prohibition on ex post facto laws.121 Alexander Hamilton
observed that “[t]he creation of crimes after the commission of the fact . . .
and the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the
favorite and most formidable instruments of tyrants.”122 The prohibition
against ex post facto laws is therefore “one aspect of the broader
constitutional protection against arbitrary changes in the law.”123 Third,

115
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 547-48 (2001).
116
Magill, supra note __, at 1193 (“[D]ecisions by prosecutors about how to enforce a
statute are indistinguishable from lawmaking. That is, given that the range of permissible
enforcement actions under criminal laws (and many other laws) is extremely broad, it is the
prosecutors’ pattern of decisions that shape the meaning of law, not the underlying statute
itself.”).
117
Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl. 1. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 323 (“A bill
of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.”); Chadha,
462 U.S. at 962 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that the prohibition on
bills of attainder reflects the Framers’ “concern that a legislature should not be able
unilaterally to impose a substantial deprivation on one person”).
118
381 U.S. 437 (1965).
119
Id. at 442.
120
Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of
Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 309 (1989).
121
As the Court has explained, the Ex Post Facto Clause “restricts governmental power
by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S.
24 (1981). See also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (calling the Ex Post
Facto Clause an “additional bulwark in favor of the personal security of the subject”).
122
The Federalist No. 84, 511-12. Indeed, this was so important that the original
Constitution prohibited not only Congress, but the states, from passing ex post facto laws.
Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law….”).
123
Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 440 (1997).
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Article I limits Congress’ authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus,
which is a key individual protection against unlawful detention.124
Article I expressly deals with legislative interference with the judicial
function, but what if the legislature works with the executive to single out
disfavored minorities for prosecution?125 That is, suppose the laws are
generally applicable, but they get enforced only against unpopular groups
or political enemies of the party in power. The prohibition on bills of
attainder will not suffice because the law itself does not target anyone
specifically. And ex post facto prohibitions will not serve as a check if the
laws are forward-looking. Yet the dangers would be the same as the ones
that the ex post facto and bill of attainder provisions are designed to
combat.
The separation of powers recognizes and addresses this threat. It
requires not only that the executive and legislative branches agree to
criminalize conduct, but includes the judiciary as a key check on those
political branches.126 Judges, with life tenure and salary protections, have
the independence that can enable them to check both the legislature and the
executive. Judges are therefore tasked with enforcing the prohibitions
against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. More fundamentally,
before anyone can be convicted, he or she is entitled to judicial process.
Even these protections were inadequate to the Framers, however,
because they relied on judges for their enforcement. Although Article III
judges are relatively more independent than Congress and the Executive
Branch, they are still part of the government. Because separation of
powers is concerned, among other things, with conflicts of interest,127
judges were not deemed sufficient protection against the possibility of state
abuse in criminal cases because of their potential partiality toward the

124

Art. I. § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
Alexander Hamilton praised the writ of habeas in the Federalist Papers because it checks
“the practice of arbitrary imprisonments . . . in all agencies, [one of] the favourite and most
formidable instruments of tyranny.” Federalist No. 84, at 444.
125
Montesquieu warned against combining executive and legislative powers because the
executive in that instance would not be able to check the legislature and it would increase
the likelihood of tyrannical law execution. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE
LAWS 70 (Frank Neuman ed., Encyclopedia Brittanica 1952) (1748). But it does not take a
formal alliance for this to occur. As Daryl Levinson points out, the executive and legislative
branches often ally with one another because they are members of a common party. Daryl J.
Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915,
952-58 (2005).
126
Prakash, supra note __, at 1754 (“Americans viewed judging, in part, as a check on
the executive’s law enforcement.”).
127
Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of
Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 304-307 (1989) (describing the historical
roots of the conflict-of-interest concerns motivating the separation of powers and noting that
“the notion that no man can be a judge in his own cause was among the earliest expressions
of the rule of law in Anglo-American jurisprudence”).
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government.128 The Constitution therefore provides in Article III – the
article establishing the judicial role in government – that the trial of all
crimes must be by jury. The jury’s unreviewable power to acquit gives it
the ability to check both the legislative and executive branches.129 And
because federal juries must be unanimous, all representative members of
the community must agree before political actors can label the conduct of
an individual criminal.130 The jury, then, is a key component of the
separation of powers in the criminal law.131
Other constitutional provisions reflect a similar concern with the
danger to liberty associated with the criminal process.132 Although the
executive can sometimes pose a threat to liberty, it can also act as a check
on the other branches. Thus, Article II vests the President with the power
to pardon federal offenses, except for impeachment.133 As the Supreme
Court has explained, this power “exists to afford relief from undue
harshness or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the
criminal law.”134
The Framers’ concern with expansive state criminal powers becomes
more evident with the adoption of the Bill of Rights. Four of the first ten
amendments deal explicitly with criminal process. The Fourth Amendment
regulates the state’s policing and investigative powers. The Fifth
Amendment acts as a check on the state’s executive powers by providing
for the right to a grand jury and prohibiting the state from prosecuting
individuals twice for the same offense. And, of course, the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause (and later, the 14th Amendment’s Due
Process Clause) makes sure the government follows proper process before
depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property. The Sixth Amendment
reiterates the centrality of the jury’s role in adjudicating criminal cases,
making clear that the jury will be drawn from the local community in
which a crime occurs. In addition, the Sixth Amendment provides a host of
additional rights to defendants: the right to a speedy and public trial, notice
of criminal charges, confrontation, and assistance of counsel. And the
128

Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in
an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 49-50, 56-58 (2003).
129
See id. at 48-51 (explaining how this checking function operates). See also id. at 6364 (“Injecting the jury into the affairs of the judiciary and giving it a nullification power that
the judge does not possess gives the people a greater say on how criminal laws are applied. .
. . Not only does this curb the authority of the judges themselves, but it also provides a
check on the legislature and executive, which both serve broader constituencies that may not
have the same interests as the jury drawn from the community.”).
130
Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1261, 1271-72 (2000).
131
Barkow, supra note __, at 64-65 (“The criminal jury provides yet an additional check
– one from outside the government itself.”).
132
The Constitution’s concern is with the deprivation of individual liberty, not the
granting of privileges to individuals. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 966 n.9 (“When Congress grants
particular individuals relief or benefits under its spending power, the danger of oppressive
action that the separation of powers was designed to avoid is not implicated.”).
133
U.S. Const. Art. II, §2, cl. 1.
134
Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120-21 (1925).
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Eighth Amendment regulates the states’ legislative judgments by putting a
cap on punishment. There is thus abundant constitutional regulation of all
aspects of government criminal power, from investigation to prosecution,
from adjudication to the legislation defining punishment. These powers are
strictly defined and divided, just as they are in Articles I, II, and III.
Akhil Amar argues that the Bill of Rights protections were not
originally conceived as a litany of rights, but as structural limits to protect
local majorities from national power.135 At the heart of this scheme,
according to Amar, is the jury. Thus, many of these protections were
designed to preserve the power of the criminal jury to act as a kind of local
government check on corrupt or abusive national power.136 Regardless of
whether Amar is correct in the totality of his analysis, there is no denying
the structural elements of the Bill of Rights and their separation of and
defenses against state executive, adjudicative, and legislative powers in
order to protect rights.137
At the core of the Constitution’s original structural protections and
those of the Bill of Rights for criminal proceedings sits the judiciary –
judges and juries alike – and the judicial process. For it is it the judiciary
that must enforce provisions like the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto
Clauses to prevent the legislature and the executive from obtaining judicial
power,138 and it is the judiciary that must ensure that the constitutional
judicial process is followed. With its relative insulation from majoritarian
pressures, judges can help assure fair and impartial decisionmaking in a
given case.139 Justice Scalia has argued that the “most significant role[]”
135

AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998). For
example, the Fourth and Eighth Amendment, in Amar’s view, were designed to place limits
on state power in those instances where the jury could not provide a check. That is, because
courts issue arrest warrants, set bail, and sentence without juries, additional protections were
needed. Id. at 87.
136
For the Framers, the worry was overreaching by the national government. The 14th
Amendment expands the protections to cover state abuse of power as well and to place more
emphasis on the rights-protecting function of the amendments.
137
See Roderick M. Hills, Back to the Future? How the Bill of Rights Might be about
Structure After All (Review of AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION), 93 NW. U. L. REV. 977, 996 (1999) (“rights depend on a set of complex
institutions for their defense and definition and without these institutions rights became
mere ‘parchment barriers’”) (citing JACK N. RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS: A BRIEF HISTORY
WITH DOCUMENTS 22-23 (1998)).
138
As Philip Kurland notes, the “judiciary was at the cornerstone of the concept of a
‘limited constitution’ for which separation of powers was to be a guarantee.” Philip B.
Kurlan, The Rise and Fall of the ‘Doctrine’ of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REV. 592,
599 (1986). See also Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Company, 458
U.S. 50, 58 (1982) (“The Federal Judiciary was therefore designed by the Framers to stand
independent of the Executive and Legislature – to maintain the checks and balances of the
constitutional structure, and also to guarantee that the process of adjudication itself
remained impartial.”).
139
“The Framers also understood that a principal benefit of the separation of judicial
power from the legislative and executive powers would be the protection of individual
litigants from decisionmakers susceptible to majoritarian pressures.” Schor, 478 U.S. at 860
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Neuborne, supra note __, at 399 (noting that separation
of powers “calls for an independent particularizer with power to resolve disagreements over
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for judges is “to protect the individual criminal defendant against the
occasional excesses of th[e] popular will, and to preserve the checks and
balances within our constitutional system that are precisely designed to
inhibit swift and complete accomplishment of that popular will.”140
When it comes to criminal justice, then, the separation of powers is
divined not just from the separation of Articles I, II, and III, as it is in other
contexts. Rather, there are many additional textual indications that
separating functions is critically important when the federal government
uses its criminal powers.
Under the scheme established by the
Constitution, each branch must agree before criminal power can be
exercised against an individual. Congress must criminalize the conduct,141
the executive must decide to prosecute,142 and the judiciary (judges and
juries) must convict.
This scheme provides ample evidence that the potential growth and
abuse of federal criminal power was anticipated by the Framers,143 and that
they intended to place limits on it through the separation of powers. Put
another way, the Constitution’s provisions addressing crime and the
separation of powers reflect that the Framers weighed the need for federal
government efficiency against the potential for abuse and came out heavily
in favor of limiting federal government power over crime. And, of course,
one of their preferred methods for limiting government power was the
separation of that power into strict categories.
It could be argued, however, that the extent of federal criminal law
expansion, like the extent of the growth of the administrative state, was
unexpected. In fact, federal criminal jurisdiction expanded alongside the
growth of the administrative state.144 The first major increase in federal
criminal legislation occurred after the Civil War as Congress passed
the meaning of the preexisting general rule and to ascertain the precise facts of the particular
case”).
140
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180
(1989).
141
The Court long ago rejected the judiciary’s power to recognize a federal common
law of crimes. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)
(“The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment
to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.”). See also United
States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816) (reaffirming Hudson and Goodwin).
142
The executive must also refrain from exercise the pardon power.
143
Further support for the notion of limited federal jurisdiction over crime can be
gleaned from the fact that the Constitution vested the federal government with relatively
little express jurisdiction over crime. See Art. I., §8 (giving Congress the power to punish
counterfeiting, piracies, and offenses committed on federal territory); Art. I, § 8, cls. 6, 10,
17, Art. III., § 3, cl. 1 (defining treason and authorizing Congress with the power to set the
punishment for treason). Today, Congress relies on the Commerce Clause as its
jurisdictional authority for most federal crimes. Whether Congress’s view of its authority
under the Commerce Clause is consistent with Constitution has, of course, been subject to
renewed debate in the past decade. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
144
Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts,
543 ANNALS. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 42 (1996) (“As the scope of federal
regulatory activities expanded, the scope of federal criminal laws extended as well.”).
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criminal statutes dealing with mail fraud and crimes dealing with interstate
commerce.145 Passage of the Eighteenth Amendment and Prohibition led to
another increase in federal criminal jurisdiction.146 Even after the
Eighteenth Amendment was repealed, federal criminal jurisdiction did not
retreat. The New Deal-era Congress did not just expand federal
administrative power; it passed a host of new federal criminal laws that
covered everything from bank robbery to firearms to criminal penalties for
the commission of regulatory offenses.147 When the administrative state
experienced resurgence in the 1960s and 70s,148 so, too, did federal
criminal law, as Congress turned its attention to drugs, violence, and
organized crime.149 The path of federal criminal and regulatory law has
diverged since the 1980s. There has been a strong push for deregulatory
reforms and cost-benefit analysis on the civil side,150 but federal criminal
jurisdiction continues to expand at a feverish pace.151
If this federal criminal law expansion reflects the needs of a growing
Nation and the inadequacy of the states, perhaps the same arguments in
favor of greater flexibility that have prevailed in the context of the
administrative state should apply in the context of greater federal criminal
law powers as well.152 Perhaps the federal government should be allowed
not merely to pass more substantive criminal laws, but should also be
permitted to use some of the same institutional tools that it uses in the
context of the administrative state, including agencies and more
streamlined procedures.
One reason to hesitate before reaching this conclusion is that the
presence of more federal criminal legislation may not reflect a greater need
for federal action. First, federal criminal jurisdiction remains quite small as

145

Id. at 41. Around this same time, the first cases of plea bargaining began to appear
in appellate reports. Mazzone, supra note __, at 852.
146
Beale, supra note __, at 41,
147
Id. at 41-42. This same time period witnessed the Court’s acceptance of defense
waivers of jury trials for bench trials. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
148
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 24-31 (1990).
149
Beale, supra note __, at 42-43; see also Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism,
Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 789, 792-93 (1996) (noting
that, in the two-and-a-half decades since 1971, “[f]ederal criminal jurisdiction thus became
virtually limitless”). This also coincided with the Court’s acceptance of plea bargaining in
1970. See infra TAN __-__.
150
See Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 C.F.R. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1983), as amended by Exec.
Order 13258, 67 C.F.R. 9385 (Feb. 26, 2002).
151
See Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law, American Bar Ass'n, The
Federalization of Criminal Law 7 & n.9 (1998) (noting that "[m]ore than 40% of the federal
[criminal] provisions enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since 1970" and that
"more than a quarter of the federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have
been enacted within a sixteen year period since 1980").
152
Cf. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government, supra note __, at 582 (arguing
that “the size alone of contemporary American administrative government” was
unanticipated by the Framers and puts a strain on the formalist view of separation of
powers).
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compared to state jurisdiction over crime.153
Thus, unlike the
administrative sphere, where federal regulatory authority often occupies the
field in areas like environmental law and securities regulation,154 states still
bear most of the responsibility for the regulation of crime. Second,
although the number of substantive federal offenses and prosecutions has
increased, the number of federal enforcement officers remains relatively
small. Many federal criminal laws are largely symbolic gestures that win
Members of Congress political points but that result in little practical
changes because they do not get enforced. It is thus not always clear that a
federal criminal law fills a void left by the states. On the contrary, federal
law often duplicates state law without any showing that federal intervention
is necessary.155
But even if it could be shown that, as in the context of the
administrative state, there has developed over time a greater need for the
federal government to take an active role on crime, it still does not
necessarily follow that separation of powers restrictions should be relaxed
when it comes to crime. That is because there are critical functional
differences between the two settings that the next section explores.
B.

Functional Differences

The greatest historical development when it comes to separation of
powers questions is, as previously noted, the rise of the administrative
state. That development provides the main rationale for adopting a
functional approach to separation of powers questions.156 In response to
the Depression and a government structure that seemingly failed to prevent
it, reformers turned to expert agencies that would combine functions and
address important social and economic problems. James Landis, one of the
leading architects of the New Deal, explained that the government, like a
153

In 2000, less than seven percent of felony convictions were in federal court. Bureau
of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics – 2002,
at 421 tbl.5.22, 477 tbl5.44. Almost 99 percent of violent crime prosecutions occur in state
court. Id. at 416 tbl.5.17, 447 tbl.5.44.
154
Strauss, supra note __, at 492-93 (noting “[v]irtually every part of the government
Congress has created – the Department of Agriculture as well as the Securities and
Exchange Commission – exercises all three of the governmental functions” and arguing that
the use of such agencies “is unavoidable given Congress’s need to delegate at some level the
making of policy for a complex and interdependent economy, and the equal incapacity (and
undesirability) of the courts to resolve all matters appropriately characterized as involving
‘adjudication’”).
155
See Rachel E. Barkow, Our Federal System of Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 101,
104-05 (forthcoming 2005).
156
Justice White, the leading separation of powers functionalist on the Court, explicitly
linked the administrative state and the need for a flexible approach. See, e.g., Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 113 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is “too late” to turn to the
original intent of Article III given the development of Article I courts and administrative
agencies); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 999 (noting that a flexible approach to separation of powers
is necessary to have an effective government and noting that the “Court, recognizing that
modern government must address a formidable agenda of complex policy issues,
countenanced the delegation of extensive legislative authority to Executive and independent
agencies”).
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business, needed to operate efficiently, and no business operated under the
confines of anything like a separation of powers requirement.157 On the
contrary, successful managers combined functions for increased efficiency,
and Landis and his fellow reformers wanted government to follow the same
model to deal with the complexity of society after the Industrial
Revolution.158 They reasoned that the Framers could not have anticipated
the problems they faced and would not have intended the separation of
powers to straitjacket the government into failure. The underlying idea is
that an active, unimpeded government can produce beneficial results for
society, so the government structure should be built around the agency
concept and allow it to flourish.
The Court accepted these arguments and has long allowed
administrative agencies that flout the separation of powers by combining
executive, legislative, and judicial powers.159 The acceptance of the
administrative state is the ultimate example of a functional approach to
separation of powers. But, as has been repeatedly emphasized by courts
and commentators in justifying the acceptance of administrative agencies,
regulatory agencies do not operate unchecked.160 Many structural,
procedural, and political safeguards exist to keep them from abusing
power. As this section explains, these critical protections are lacking in the
criminal arena.
1.

Lack of Structural and Procedural Safeguards

Although administrative agencies combine powers under one roof,
they do not operate unchecked. On the contrary, they are subject to a host
of procedural and structural requirements in the APA.
Agencies conducting formal adjudications must obey various
structural rules designed to ensure impartial adjudications. The individual
at the agency who presides at the hearing must be impartial161 and must be
separated from individuals at the agency who perform investigative and
157

Landis, supra note __, at 11-12.
Landis, supra note __, at 24 (discussing need for efficiency).
159
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note __, at 545 (“The combination of executive, legislative,
and adjudicative functions in administrative agencies appears to violate the separation of
powers principles embodied in the Constitution.”); Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government, supra note __, at 579 (noting the challenge agencies’ combined functions pose
for a formalist analysis); Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 761 (White, J., dissenting) (“[W]ith the
advent and triumph of the administrative state and the accompanying multiplication of the
tasks undertaken by the Federal Government, the Court has been virtually compelled to
recognize that Congress may reasonably deem it ‘necessary and proper’ to vest some among
the broad new array of government functions in officers who are free from the partisanship
that may be expected of agents wholly dependent upon the President.”).
160
Indeed, many novel government arrangements raising separation of powers concerns
are often developed to serve as checks on agency power. For example, the legislative veto
ultimately found unconstitutional in Chadha was designed to check agency power. Chadha,
462 U.S. at 968-69 (“The legislative veto developed initially in response to the problems of
reorganizing the sprawling Government structure created in response to the Depression” and
“offered the means by which Congress could confer additional authority while preserving its
own constitutional role”).
161
Id. § 556(b)
158
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prosecutorial functions.162 Administrative law judges (ALJs) also cannot
be removed by the agency for which they adjudicate, but instead can be
removed only after notice and hearing by the Merit Systems Protection
Board.163
ALJs and anyone else at the agency involved in the
decisionmaking process are prohibited from having ex parte
communications related to the merits of the proceeding,164 and the agency’s
decision must be based on the evidence in the record.165 The APA also
imposes various process requirements, including notice to interested
parties, an opportunity for interested parties to submit evidence and
arguments, and a chance for interested parties to submit proposed findings
and to make exceptions to tentative agency decisions.166 In all formal
proceedings – rulemakings and adjudications – the agency must issue a
decision on the record with a statement of its findings and conclusions.167
When agencies proceed through informal rulemaking instead of
formal rulemaking or formal adjudication, they must issue a notice of their
proposed rules and give the public an opportunity to comment.168 The
agency’s decision must be based on the facts in the record, and the agency
must disclose the evidence on which it relied in reaching a decision.169 The
agency must consider the comments it receives, and explain why it rejects
arguments made in the comments.170
All agency proceedings – formal or informal, rulemaking or
adjudication – are subject to extensive judicial review. Decisions made in
even the most informal adjudications are subject to judicial oversight to
ensure that the agency’s action is not arbitrary and capricious.171 Agencies
must explain if they change course from case to case, and there must be
support for the agency’s decision in the administrative record. If there is
evidence in the record that undermines the agency’s position or if a party or
commenter raises a serious objection to the agency’s proposal, the agency
162

5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d). See also Verkuil, supra note __, at 316 (noting that the APA’s
“separation of functions and the use of administrative law judges has done much to allay
due process concerns in that setting”); Brown, supra note __, at 1557 (noting that the
separation of executive and judicial functions in agencies has been necessary to
“compensate for departures from the structural constitutional norms”). Agency heads,
however, are exempt from the structural separation requirement. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2)(C).
163
5 U.S.C. § 7521. See also 5 U.S.C. §§ 3105, 5372 (establishing that administrative
law judges “may not perform duties inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as
administrative law judges and providing salary protections, respectively).
164
5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1).
165
Id. §556(d), (e), 557(c). Formal rulemakings, like formal adjudications, must also be
based on the evidence in the record.
166
5 U.S.C. § 554(b), (c); § 557 (c).
167
Id. §557(c)
168
5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
169
See Nova Scotia Food Products Corp. v. United States, 568 F.2d 240 (2nd Cir. 1977)
(holding that, if agency relies on scientific data, it must make that material available on the
record).
170
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
171
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The substantial evidence test for formal proceedings serves
the same function. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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must offer reasons why those arguments do not hold sway. Thus, unlike
the judicial rubber-stamping associated with rational-basis review, courts
take a “hard look” at the agency’s explanation to provide a check against
arbitrary implementation.172
Additional oversight laws – such as the Freedom of Information Act173
and the Federal Advisory Committee Act174 – grant the public additional
access to information about the agency decision-making process, which
allows further oversight to ensure that the agency is not acting arbitrarily
or on the basis of improper influences. And, to the extent that Office of
Management and Budget reviews agency rules under executive orders175
for consistency across agencies,176 this provides an additional check on
agency policies.
This oversight regime has been crucial to the Court’s acceptance of
broad delegations of legislative and judicial power to executive agencies.177
As Rebecca Brown has noted, it is precisely because agencies combine all
three types of government power that these other measures are necessary to
protect individual rights.178
Notably, these protections do not apply to the actions of key
governmental officials and agencies exercising criminal power, particularly
prosecutors. Although Kenneth Culp Davis argued almost four decades
ago that the discretion exercised by police officers and prosecutors should
be subject to the same procedural and structural checks as other

172

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40-42 (1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971).
173
5 U.S.C. § 552. (mandating the release of government records)
174
5 U.S.C. app. §2 (imposing open meeting requirements on advisory committees and
requiring additional disclosures).
175
See, e.g., Executive Order 12,291; Executive Order 12,866.
176
Richard Revesz and Nicholas Bagley point out that the harmonizing function of
OMB has been minimal. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, OMB and the Centralized
Review of Regulation 2 (2005) (draft on file with author).
177
See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 489 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the
importance of judicial review and agency rulemaking to the Court’s acceptance of broad
delegation because they “diminish[] the risk that the agency will use the breadth of a grant
of authority as a cloak for unreasonable or unfair implementation”); McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 278-79 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that
delegations of rulemaking and adjudicatory authority “have invariably provided substantial
protections to insure against arbitrary action and to guarantee that underlying questions of
policy are considered and resolved” and noting that “importance of administrative or
judicial review in providing a check on the exercise of arbitrary power”). Scholars
embracing a functional approach to separation of powers have also relied on these checks to
justify their position. See, e.g., Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government, supra note
__, at 577 (noting that “a web of other controls – judicial review and legislative and
executive oversight . . . give reasonable assurance against systemic lawlessness”).
178
Brown, supra note __, at 1555 (“to avoid an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to an administrative agency, Congress ‘must enjoin upon the agency a certain course
of procedure and certain rules of decision in the performance of its function’”) (citing
Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 260 U.S. 48, 59 (1922);
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administrative officials,179 his calls for reform were not heeded. Political
actors did not impose police regulation modeled along the lines of the
APA,180 though that might be explained in part by the fact that the Supreme
Court’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment decisions imposed constitutional
regulation on the police that might have made administrative regulation
appear unnecessary.181 But even if Court decisions explain the lack of
administrative oversight mechanisms on the police, it cannot explain the
continued lack of oversight for prosecutors.
Because of the operation of broad criminal codes and prosecutors’
leverage over plea bargaining,182 the only process – judicial or otherwise –
that most defendants receive comes from prosecutors. In the course of
reaching a negotiated disposition, “the prosecutor acts as the administrative
decision-maker who determines, in the first instance, whether an accused
will be subject to social sanction, and if so, how much punishment will be
imposed.”183 Despite the significance of prosecutorial power, prosecutors
operate with little oversight or regulation.184 The same prosecutor who
investigates a case can make the final determination about what plea to
accept. There is therefore no structural separation of adjudicative and
executive power, and defendants have no right to a formal process or
internal appeal within the agency. In addition, in the course of bargaining
with a defendant over charges, the prosecutor can engage in ex parte
contacts with the police and investigators, and the defendant need not be
179

See DAVIS, supra note __, at 80-96, 188-214. See also Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 55 MINN. L. REV. 349, 380 (1974) (arguing for
more rulemaking by the police). See also Malcolm M. Feeley, Two Models of the Criminal
Justice System: An Organizational Perspective, 7 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 407, (1973)
(arguing that “the system of criminal justice is a highly formalized and defined set of rules,
norms, and goals, but also an organization which possesses no corresponding set of
incentives and sanctions which act to systematically enforce them” and suggesting that “a
solution requiring more bureaucracy, not less”). Even before Davis, Sanford Kadish argued
for oversight of the discretion exercised by officials in the administration of criminal law
because the administration of criminal law “is not sui generis, but another administrative
agency which requires its own administrative law.” Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and
Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 931 (1962).
180
Scholars from Jerome Hall to Jerome Skolnick highlighted the problems associated
with police discretion. For an overview of this scholarship and a discussion of how theories
of democracy and accountability intersect with policing, see David Alan Sklansky, Police
and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1736-41 (2005).
181
See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 17 (1997) (noting that the Court’s Fourth and Fifth
Amendment decisions “do not just set outer boundaries for police conduct” but instead
“constitutional criminal procedure occupies the field”).
182
Lynch, supra note __, at 2136 (“So long as our criminal codes contain too many
prohibitions, the contents of which are left to be defined by their implementation, or which
cover conduct that is clearly not intended to be punished in every instance, or which provide
for the punishment of those who act without wrongful intent, prosecutors must exercise
judgment about which of the many cases that are technically covered by the criminal law are
really worthy of criminal punishment.”).
183
Lynch, supra note __, at 2135.
184
Lynch, supra note __, at 2124 (“Because our governing ideology does not admit that
prosecutors adjudicate guilt and set punishments, the procedures by which they do so are
neither formally regulated nor invariably followed.”).
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given access to the information on which the prosecutor relies – that is, the
prosecutor’s evidence of the defendant’s guilt.185
While judges oversee prosecutors to make sure the plea is knowing
and voluntary and that there is a factual basis for the plea,186 their inquiry is
a cursory one.187 Judge Gerard Lynch aptly describes the judicial part of
this process as follows:
In a substantial number of cases, the judicial “process”
consists of the simultaneous filing of a criminal charge by
a prosecutor (often by means of a prosecutor’s
“information” rather than an indictment, with the defendant
waiving the submission of the evidence and charge to a
grand jury) and admission of guilt by the defendant. The
charging document may be quite skeletal, the defendant’s
account of his guilty actions brief, and the judicial inquiry
concerned more with whether the defendant is of sound
mind and understands the consequences of what he is
doing than with the accuracy of the facts to which he is
attesting.188
Thus, instead of being subject to the hard look review that other agencies
face, prosecutors face only a cursory judicial inquiry.
Without judicial review of their decisions, prosecutors need not treat
similar cases similarly for purposes of plea bargaining, and they need not
explain why they agreed to reach a deal with one defendant, but refused to
do so with another defendant guilty of the same crime. Indeed, because
prosecutors need not make the terms of their plea bargains available to the
public through publication, a defendant might not even know that another
similarly situated defendant received a particular deal.189 Nor may
defendants be aware that a prosecutor is diverging from office policy.
Judge Lynch notes that prosecutors’ offices will often change their
enforcement policies, and likens these shifts to an administrative agency’s
decision to issue a new set of regulations.190 But unlike an administrative
agency’s policies, the prosecutor’s policies are not openly disclosed to the

185

Id. at 2128-29.
See infra TAN __-__.
187
See Lynch, supra note __, at 2122.
188
Lynch, supra note __, at 2122. As Lynch further notes, judges in this system
typically lack sufficient information to make an informed decision about the defendant’s
guilt, id., and the federal rules do not require that a judge determine that the defendant is
guilty, “let alone guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at n.5 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(f)).
189
Id. at 2132 (“unlike the opinions of courts, [prosecutorial plea] decisions are not
published, permitting discriminatory advantage to defendants represented by ‘insider’
counsel who are well informed about local prosecutorial practice, and leaving the precise
‘holdings’ of prior cases subject to reinterpretation, shifting memory, and policy change”).
190
Id. at 2141.
186
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public and are not subject to arbitrary and capricious review for reasoned
consistency.191
The Supreme Court is of the view that a prosecutor’s decision to indict
or enter a plea agreement with a defendant is largely off limits from judicial
review.192 Prosecutorial law enforcement is largely exempt from open
government laws like FOIA.193 Without judicial oversight or any internal
constraints, the potential for arbitrary enforcement is high.194 The only
review of prosecutors’ decisions comes in the form of the defendant’s right
to reject a plea and take his or her case to trial.195 But a defendant takes a
big gamble in exercising this power of review, because if the defendant is
found guilty, he or she is subject to a harsher punishment. If prosecutors
were treated like other administrative agencies, judicial review of
discretion would not come at such a price.
Nor is the lack of structural oversight in the federal criminal process
limited to prosecutors. Even when Congress created the Sentencing
Commission, a federal criminal agency modeled in crucial respects after
traditional administrative agencies, it failed to subject it to key APA
requirements. While the Sentencing Reform Act requires that the
Sentencing Commission’s rulemaking proceedings comply with the notice
and comment requirements of the APA, the rules themselves are not
subject to judicial review and no other APA restrictions apply.196
There is, then, a sharp incongruity between the treatment of discretion
in the administrative context and the criminal context. The Court accepted
the constitutionality of the administrative state against the backdrop of
structural and procedural protections that protect against the danger of
combining powers under one roof and allowing one branch of government
191
See Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 25 (1971) (noting that the general practice of prosecutors is
not to publish their policies).
192
In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970), the Court rejected the claim that
it violates the Fifth Amendment for a prosecutor “to influence or encourage a guilty plea by
opportunity or promise of leniency and that a guilty plea is coerced or invalid if influenced
by the fear of a possibly higher penalty for the crime charged if a conviction is obtained
after the State is put to its proof.”
193
5 U.S.C. § 552b(5) (exempting information “involve[ing] accusing any person of a
crime”); 552b(7) (exempting “investigatory records compiled for law enforcement
purposes” but noting that the exemption only applies under certain circumstances, such as if
release of the information would interfere with the proceedings, would disclose investigative
techniques or procedures, or would deprive a person of a right to an impartial adjudication).
194
Cf. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that
the problem with the legislative veto is that “Congress is not subject to any internal
constraints that prevent it from arbitrarily depriving [Chadha] of the right to remain in this
country” and “[u]nlike the judiciary or an administrative agency, Congress is not bound by
established substantive rules” “[n]or is it subject to the procedural safeguards. . . that are
present when a court or agency adjudicates individual rights”).
195
Lynch, supra note __, at 2135 (noting that in plea bargaining, “the formal adversarial
jury trial serves as a kind of judicial review, in which a defendant who is not content with
the administrative adjudication by the prosecutor has a right to de novo review of the
decision in another forum”).
196
28 U.S.C. § 994(x).
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to exercise disproportionate authority. Because those protections are
lacking in the context of criminal matters, the same arguments in favor of
flexibility do not apply.
2.

Lack of Political Safeguards

The structural and procedural checks supplied by the APA are not the
only mechanisms for checking agency abuse that are absent in the criminal
context.
Political oversight mechanisms provide a key check on
administrative agencies, but they do not work as effectively when it comes
to criminal enforcement.197
When the government regulates non-criminal as opposed to criminal
conduct, many interested groups have the incentive and the power to police
the government’s policies. Typically, public interest and consumer groups
seek more regulation while corporations and industry groups advocate less
regulation. The targets of regulation are often the more powerful force, as
they have the incentives and the means to fight government interference
and get procedural and substantive protections through the normal course
of politics.198 Regulated entities can make credible threats that they will
obtain favorable legislation that overrules the agency or that they will
challenge the agency in time-consuming court proceedings. This gives
them leverage with the agency that acts as a check on government
overreaching.199 Thus, in the typical regulatory context, groups line up on
both sides of the issue and, if anything, there are more powerful forces
operating to check too much government intervention.
The political process is more skewed when it comes to crime,
particularly federal legislation aimed at substantive crime definition and
sentencing.200 Neither criminal defendants nor judges – the two main
197

Cf. Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 490 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(accepting broad delegation to President under Line Item Veto Act because the President is
an elected official subject to oversight by the voters).
198
See Barkow, supra note __, at 723-24 (describing the typical interest group scenario);
Bagley & Revesz, supra note __, at 24-25 (citing studies that show regulated industries
typically spend more money and file more comments than their public-interest
counterparts); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 126-41 (1998) (citing studies that show regulated parties
have greater access to agencies than public interest groups).
199
Some argue that regulated interests have too much power over agencies, and that
mechanisms should be put in place to prevent agency capture. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill,
Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997); see also
Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The Federal Aviation
Administration, “Agency Capture,” and Airline Security, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y &
L. 381 (2002); Dion Casey, Agency Capture: The USDA’s Struggle to Pass Food Safety
Regulations, 7-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 142 (1998). Cf. Einer R. Elhauge, Does
Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991).
Whether regulated interests have too much power is beyond the scope of this Article. The
argument here is simply that the political process is more balanced outside the criminal
sphere than within it.
200
I have explored the politics of sentencing in greater detail in Barkow, supra note __,
at 723-35; Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1276, (2005). Ronald Wright has explained that the interest group dynamics vary
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targets of criminal punishment legislation – have much sway on the
political process. Those who have not been caught committing a crime are
rarely going to self-identify to lobby for lesser punishments or more narrow
crime definitions,201 so that leaves those already convicted, perhaps the
weakest of all groups in the political arena. By virtue of their conviction,
they often lose the right to vote, and they are a weak lobbying force even
when they retain it.202 And while their families and communities have an
interest in advocating on their behalf, these groups currently lack political
power.203 Judges, the objects of legislation aimed at curbing sentencing
discretion, are more effective lobbyists than criminal defendants, but they
have been largely unsuccessful in stopping legislation aimed at curbing
their discretion.204
While the targets of regulation are weak, proponents of more
expansive criminal laws are not.205 Prosecutors have an incentive to
request broader criminal laws and longer, mandatory sentences because
those laws make it easier for them to obtain defendants’ cooperation in plea
bargaining.206 Groups with a stake in the expansion of the prisons –
including rural communities, corrections officer unions, and private prison
companies – are powerful forces in favor of longer sentences. Vicims’
depending on whether the government is regulating substantive criminal law, policing,
adjudication of criminal cases, or punishment. Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for
Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 255-56
(2004). In particular, he notes that the process is more balanced when it comes to
legislation addressing adjudication. Id. at 259-60.
201
Individuals and corporations engaged in legal enterprises who anticipate the danger
that their conduct might be seen as crossing the line over to criminality are the ones most
likely to pay attention to crime definition and sanctions to protect themselves. Thus, the
political process is likely to be most balanced when it comes to regulatory and white collar
crimes.
202
As Harold Krent notes, criminal offenders are not only weak because of their status
as convicted individuals, but they also tend to be poor and disproportionately comprised of
minorities, which further weakens their political clout. Harold J. Krent, Should Bouie Be
Buoyed?: Judicial Retroactive Lawmaking and the Ex Post Facto Clause, 3 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 35, 85-86 (1997).
203
Barkow, supra note __, at 725-27 (explaining that those advocating for criminal
defendants have little power now but that circumstances may eventually change).
204
Federal judges have lobbied for sentencing and substantive criminal law reforms
largely through the Judicial Conference. See Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary:
Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
269, 281-83 (2000) (describing Judicial Conference reform efforts on sentencing and
criminal justice policy). While those efforts yielded some success in the first half of the 20th
century, id .at 281-82 (describing judicial influence over the 1950 Federal Youth
Corrections Act), judges have had little success in recent decades curbing congressional
efforts to limit their discretion through mandatory minimum sentences and more stringent
sentencing guidelines. See id. at 283 (“Between the late 1950s and the 1990s, the Judicial
Conference had many times opposed legislation that, despite its commentary, became
law.”); see also Barkow, supra note __, at 724-25 (noting that judges do not engage in
concerted lobbying in the same way as traditional regulated entities).
205
As Bill Stuntz points out, because “it is much cheaper for interest groups to lobby for
criminal legislation than against it,” the usual political dynamic – “where legislation is
easier to block than to generate” – is inverted). William J. Stuntz, Reply: Criminal Law’s
Pathology, 101 MICH. L. REV. 828, 836 (2002).
206
Barkow, supra note __, at 728 & n. 25 (giving examples of prosecutor lobbying).
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rights groups similarly endorse longer sentences and more expansive
criminal laws.207 The public is also supportive of harsher criminal laws and
easily mobilized by politicians or interest groups to get behind “tough on
crime” initiatives.208
Because the targets of regulation are weak and the voices in favor of
broader laws and longer punishments are powerful, the political system is
biased in favor of more severe punishments. There are few forces that can
counter the government when it overreaches on crime. As Jeremy
Bentham observed, “legislators and men in general are naturally inclined”
in that direction because “antipathy, or a want of compassion for
individuals who are represented as dangerous and vile, pushes them onward
to an undue severity.”209 Bentham therefore advocated that that “[i]t is on
this side [towards severity], therefore, that we should take the most
precautions, as on this side there has been shown the greatest disposition to
err.”210
The scheme of separated powers is designed to do just that.211 The
Constitution makes it difficult for the state to act in criminal cases against
individuals and members of groups disfavored by the majority.212 All three
branches must agree to allow a criminal conviction, and the judiciary plays
a particularly significant role because of its relative insulation from the
political imbalance described above.
In the absence of political or structural protections, the impediments to
action provided by the separation of powers check state abuse and preserve
the interests of individuals and local and political minorities. This
argument for separation of powers is therefore the classic representation
reinforcing theory for judicial review. Thus, arguments for dismantling
this scheme on the basis of efficiency grounds – that the state is hamstrung
in its ability to proceed in criminal cases – disrupt the very core of why we
have separation of powers in the first place. The inefficiency associated
with the separation of powers serves a valuable function and in the context
of criminal law, no other mechanism provides a substitute.

207

Id. at 729.
Id. at 729-30.
209
JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW, pt. II, bk. 1, ch. 6 in THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 401 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
210
Id. Schumpeter also argued that the content of criminal laws should not be left
purely to politics because crime “is a complex phenomenon” that leads to “fits of
vindictiveness and . . . sentimentality” and where “[p]opular slogans about it are almost
invariably wrong.” JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 292
(Harper Perennial 1976) (1942)
211
For example, scholars such as Harold Krent and Dan Kahan have noted that this
rationale best explains the prohibition on ex post facto laws. Dan M. Kahan, Some Realism
About Retroactive Criminal Lawmaking, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 95, 112-17 (1997);
Krent, supra note ___, at 88-92.
212
“[T]he processes embedded in the structure of our institutions [should] be respected
whenever the government seeks to act in derogation of values which are vulnerable to
majoritarian overreaching.” Neuborne, supra note __, at 437-38.
208
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C.

Individual Rights Protections are Insufficient

Separation of powers is not the only means by which the Constitution
protects the interests of criminal defendants. The Bill of Rights, as noted,
provides additional protections to prevent the political process from
targeting individuals. It is important to consider whether the abundant
protections offered in the Bill of Rights render the importance of separation
of powers protections less significant in criminal matters. Put another way,
if the individual rights protections serve the same function as the various
procedural and structural protections of the APA and check the political
process failures, then there would not be the same need for greater
enforcement of the separation of powers.
Indeed, the view that the Bill of Rights acts as a sufficient check may
explain the general lack of separation of powers arguments in criminal
cases and the Court’s relaxed treatment of them when they do arise. Most
constitutional challenges in criminal cases are based on the rights
protections in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. Because
the Supreme Court was receptive to so many of these claims in the 1960s
and early 1970s,213 litigants grew reliant on arguments couched in these
terms. This tradition of regulating criminal process through rights has
continued even as the Court has grown more conservative. It is quite
possible that the Court’s oversight of the criminal process through rights
protections is one of the reasons it was not concerned that Mistretta and
Morrison used novel governmental arrangements in criminal matters.
Perhaps the Court’s willingness to allow a melding of powers reflected the
Court’s confidence that it retained enough judicial oversight through the
rights provisions to correct any egregious misalignment of power in any
given case.214 In administrative law contexts where the Court applied a
formalist separation of powers analysis, in contrast, the courts did not
oversee the minutiae of the procedures in the same way.215
If this does explain the Court’s reluctance to police separation of
powers in criminal cases, the Court has a false sense of security. “It would
be a grave mistake . . . to think a Bill of Rights in Madison’s scheme [at the
Founding] or in sound constitutional theory now renders separation of
powers of lesser importance.”216 The rights-based procedural measures are
valuable, but they are incomplete protections against government
overreaching in criminal matters. Although the rights protections police
213

See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule to the states); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police
to warn suspects of their right to counsel and their right to remain silent)
214
Interestingly, the measures required in Hamdi were designed to give the courts some
measure of oversight over the process.
215
For example, the Court may have rejected the budget reforms in Bowsher and the
line-item veto in Clinton because the budget process is largely immune from judicial review.
And in one of the other cases in which the Court employed a functional analysis (Schor, in
which agencies were allowed to adjudicate private rights claims), the continuing role of
judicial review was critical to the Court’s decision.
216
Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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government abuse of power to an extent, they do not guard against the
same structural abuses as the separation of powers.217
The separation of powers acts as a direct check against the
accumulation of too much power in one branch and against the evasion of
the process required of that branch, something that individual rights
protections do not guard against.218 For example, if the legislature were
permitted to adjudicate criminal matters, none of the protections that apply
to Article III courts would apply, nor would the legislature be subject to the
rules of judicial process. The legislature is designed to pass general rules,
not to decide matters affecting the liberty of individuals.219 Thus, if
Congress were allowed to have judicial powers, the protections associated
with judicial process could be bypassed. Similarly, if the executive branch
were permitted not merely to bring enforcement actions but to adjudicate
them, the judiciary and all of its processes would be rendered a nullity.
To be sure, to the extent the Court interprets individual rights
protections to require the adjudication by the right constitutional actor, it
will be serving the same interests as the separation of powers. So, for
example, if the Court insists that the defendants must have a jury trial, that
will have the effect of precluding the legislature or executive from usurping
the judicial function. But not all individual rights protections work in this
way, and the danger is that Congress or the executive will find ways around
trial protections by evading trial itself.
That is, in fact, what has happened. With the rise of plea bargaining,
trials are anomalies, not the norm. And the individual rights approach to
plea bargaining has done nothing to prevent the executive’s accumulation
of judicial power. Under the individual rights approach, a court merely
asks whether a plea in a given case is knowing and voluntary,220 and for
most defendants, the deal offered by the government will likely be in their
interests, so that requirement is satisfied. While an individual defendant
might find it in his or her interest to waive a constitutional right to get a
better deal, plea bargaining is not in defendants’ interests as a group.221 It
217

Akhil Amar, the leading proponent of the view that the Bill of Rights protects the
same structural values as the original Constitution, does not argue that the Bill of Rights
renders the original constitutional protections irrelevant. Rather, he argues that they are
designed to complement those protections. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132 (1991).
218
“[L]iberty demands limits on the ability of any one branch to influence basic political
decisions.” Clinton. 524 U.S. at 450-51 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
219
That is why “Montesquieu emphasized the importance of judicial procedures, even
when costly or cumbersome, as a protection for the individual from this type of harm – as a
guarantor of ‘liberty.’” Brown, supra note __, at 1536.
220
See infra TAN __-__.
221
As Richard Epstein has pointed out, this logic explains the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. Although an individual might find it in his or her interest to waive a
constitutional right, the danger is that as a group, they are worse off. Because of these
structural concerns of monopoly government power, collective action problems, and
externalities, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not allow most rights to be
bargaining. Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits
of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988). But this doctrine has not been applied to criminal
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curtails the ability of the judicial branch to check abuses in the political
process, and once plea bargaining is deemed acceptable and becomes the
normal mode of case disposition, it encourages Congress to draft its
criminal laws and sentences with plea bargaining in mind.222 That is, it
makes sense for Congress to draft criminal statutes broadly and with high
penalties to give prosecutors the leverage they need to induce guilty
pleas.223 Indeed, plea bargaining pressures even innocent defendants to
plead guilty to avoid the risk of high statutory sentences. And for those
who do take their case to trial and lose, they receive longer sentences than
even Congress or the prosecutor might think appropriate, because the
longer sentences are there largely for bargaining purposes.224 This often
results in individuals who plea receiving shorter sentences than other
individuals who are less morally culpable but take a chance and go to
trial.225 Plea bargaining therefore fails to serve the interests of the public,
as it tends to undermine the legitimacy and accuracy of the criminal justice
system.226 The individual rights perspective misses these structural
concerns whereas a separation of powers analysis would call into question
existing plea bargaining practices.
Thus, individual rights protections cannot bear the weight of policing
structural inequalities that the separation of powers is designed to
address.227 And without other institutional or political checks to fill the
void, the criminal process is susceptible to abuses associated with
unchecked power unless careful attention is paid to the constitutional
protections provided by the separation of powers.

trial rights, so the structural dangers that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine polices are
prevalent.
222
Assuming that criminal justice expenditures will be relatively constant in a regime
with or without plea bargaining, plea bargaining frees up resources that would otherwise be
spent on trial process and allows them to be used for incarceration. Conversely, the
elimination of plea bargaining would require the shortening of sentences to shift funds
currently spent on incarceration to the trial process. Schulhofer, supra note __, at 1993.
223
See Barkow, supra note __, at 728 n.25 (citing examples of Department of Justice
requests for more stringent sentences because it would make defendants more likely to
cooperate with prosecutors). See also Stuntz, supra note __, at 529-31.
224
See Barkow, supra note __, at 728.
225
See, e.g., Federal Judge Bemoans 90-Year Minimum Sentence (Judge Thomas
McAvoy lamented the 90-year sentence meted out to a bank robbery getaway driver while
another participant who threatened bank employees with a handgun will receive no more
than 43 years because of a guilty plea), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/ (last
visited Aug. 25, 2005).
226
Id. at 1985, 2001 (noting that the conviction of innocents imposes “serious negative
externalities” on the public and arguing that there is a “social interest in not punishing
defendants who are factually innocent . . . even if individual defendants would prefer to
have that option”).
227
The argument here is not to suggest that the procedural rights must therefore be
eliminated. Rather, the point here is that they alone cannot protect the interests of
defendants and the overall functioning of the criminal justice system.
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III.

FORMALISM AND CRIMINAL LAW

To conclude that criminal law matters merit greater separation of
powers protection than administrative law matters still does not answer the
question of how best to enforce those protections.228 Should the courts
employ a formalist analysis along the lines of Chadha or Bowsher, in
which the Court uses a rule-bound approach that requires that each branch
exercise only a certain type of power and that all of the constitutional
procedures associated with the exercise of that power must be followed?
Or should a functional analysis be employed, albeit with a thumb on the
scale for maintaining strict separation in criminal matters?
Although either of these approaches would be an improvement over
the current functional methodology that has allowed much relaxation in the
criminal sphere, the bright-line rule variant of formalism229 employed in
many of the Court’s separation of powers cases seems to be the best course.
In determining what type of power is being exercised and what checks the
Constitution requires, the Court could continue to use conventional
methods of interpretation, which would allow the Court to consider, text,
history, precedent, and evolved practices.230
The remainder of this section will defend this approach to separation
of powers in criminal cases.231 Section A discusses the benefits of
formalism over functionalism when it comes to criminal law and explains
why the costs of formalism are consistent with the constitutional scheme
and why they are outweighed by the benefits they bring. Because the
application of this approach is best understood through concrete settings,
section B will explain how this approach would change the outcome in two
228

See Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000
SUP. CT. REV. 357, 364 (2000) (pointing out that “the disagreement between formalists and
functionalists is not about constitutional meaning, but rather about a choice between
alternative decision-making strategies”). For a general discussion of how the Court must
implement
229
For a helpful typology of forms of formalism, see Pildes, supra note __, at 607-21.
230
Being a formalist does not mean being an originalist. See Merill, supra note __, at
32 (distinguishing between formalism that is linked with originalism and what he calls a
“conventional approach to constitutional interpretation” that “draw[]s upon a variety of
sources that our legal community regards as authoritative” including text, history, precedent,
and evolved practices).
But the evolved practices should be viewed with caution, to the extent that they resulted
from the Court’s laissez-faire attitude to separation of powers in the criminal context
without concern for proper checks. That is, because many practices in criminal law
developed because the Court accepted innovations in the criminal sphere on the assumption
that they mirrored administrative law developments, special attention must be paid to ensure
that the protections that exist in the administrative context are present when it comes to
crime. If sufficient protections have not evolved to check those practices, the Court should
not permit them to continue until safeguards are in place.
231
The Article takes no position on the proper approach to separation of powers
questions outside the criminal law context. It is therefore a variant of what my colleague
Burt Neuborne has called a “limited” theory of separation of powers – it identifies an area of
“fundamental values” that “trigger[s] strict separation of powers review.” Burt Neuborne,
Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United States, 57 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 363, 368 (1982).
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of the cases discussed in Part I, Morrison and Mistretta. Part IV will then
explore how this analysis would apply more generally to a major area of
concern in criminal law today, plea bargaining.
A.

The Case for Formalism

Although scholars have long touted the general benefits associated
with bright-line formalism, such as its predictability and reduced decision
costs,232 the argument for formalism advocated here rests on more specific
grounds. Because the judiciary (judges and juries alike) serves as the
critical safety valve against the political abuse of the criminal process, the
separation of powers threat in this context will likely result from subtle
shifts in authority that have the result of stripping the judiciary of some of
its authority.
One might think that this is therefore an area in which the judiciary
will be particularly sensitive to the dangers of separation of powers because
it will protect its own interests with vigilance.233 But this has not been
borne out by the case law. It has been in those cases where judicial power
has been lessened that the Court has been least protective of the separation
of powers. In Schor, the Court accepted agency adjudication of private
law claims even though they had traditionally rested with Article III
courts.234 Similarly, in Mistretta, the Court permitted a sentencing scheme
that shifted power from the judiciary to the executive branch and the
232
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note __, at __. Of course, the debate over bright-line
rules versus flexible standards is much broader than the scope of this Article. For a general
overview, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J.
557 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term--Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1989); Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). This Article takes no
position on this larger debate because the argument for formalism presented here rests on a
different set of virtues unique to the context of criminal law.
233
Adrian Vermeule noticed precisely this dynamic in examining state cases involving
separation of powers claims involving “freestanding claims of judicial power.” The state
courts employed a functional analysis that, in Vermeule’s description, overvalued judicial
power and prerogatives. Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal)
Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 360-61, 390 (2000). Vermeule distinguishes the claims he
analyzed from those involving “specific constitutional provisions that protect or regulate the
judiciary’s authority and jurisdiction,” such as the right of jury trial. Id. at n.1. Because
some of the separation of powers arguments in criminal cases discussed here rest on the jury
requirement in Article III, see infra Part IV, they fall outside the scope of Vermeule’s
argument. Additionally, there is little empirical or theoretical reason for believing that, even
in the context of more generalized judicial power claims, the same dynamic identified by
Vermeule in the state cases would apply in federal criminal cases. While Vermeule is right
to point out that the “judiciary has better information about, and greater solicitude for, its
own interests than about competing social interests,” id. at 402, that is likely to mean that
the judiciary will pay more attention to the effect criminal cases have on the functioning of
the system and less attention to how a system of plea bargaining and prosecutorial
sentencing power acts to systematically disadvantage criminal defendants.
234
Indeed, the Court expressly mentioned in Schor that “bright-line rules cannot
effectively be employed to yield broad principles applicable in all Article III inquiries.” 478
U.S. at 857.
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legislature.235 As Peter Strauss has observed, “an observer might conclude
that the Court seems much more clearly committed to functionalism in
examining its own place in the constitutional scheme than in dealing with
issues concerning the other two heads of government.”236 Strauss posits
two possible explanations for this trend. Either the Court is “appropriately
modest in declaring constitutional principles that might appear to enshrine
the Court’s own place, or it may reflect self-interested relief at being freed
of the need to decide matters of routine in litigation-rich times.”237
Given the Court’s general lack of modesty when it comes to deciding
constitutional questions and the ever-expansive view it takes of its own
power,238 it would seem that the more likely cause is the Court’s receptivity
to claims that a proposed change in government will yield efficiency gains
for the judiciary. This is particularly so if the judiciary retains some
residual authority over the subject matter through appellate oversight.
Thus, in Schor, the Court relinquished authority to agencies to adjudicate
state private law claims in the first instance because the judiciary could
review the agencies’ decisions. Similarly, in Mistretta, although trial
judges would lose a great deal of sentencing discretion, they could still
depart in some category of cases that would be subject to appellate review.
The Court’s decision in Morrison also supports this hypothesis. In
Morrison, it appeared that the judiciary’s power increased vis-à-vis the
executive, for the judges of the Special Division obtained authority to
appoint a prosecutor. If the Court were being “modest,” presumably it
would find this transfer of power disconcerting. That it did not suggests
that the Court saw this apparent increase of authority acceptable,
particularly given that it would not increase the workload of the courts.
And if the scheme posed a threat to an individual criminal defendant, the
courts retained oversight through their role in criminal trials.
The argument for formalism, then, essentially boils down to distrust
that judges will be able to give sufficient weight to the long-term, systemic
interests the separation of powers protects when faced with a reasonable
claim of governmental need for flexibility in the criminal context.239 This
is, of course, a common justification for formalist analysis.240 But it has
235
Indeed, the Court itself observed that “the power of the judicial branch is, if
anything, somewhat diminished by the Act.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 395. The Court also
employed a functionalist analysis in two cases – Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295
U.S. 602 (1935) and Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) – that allowed removal
restrictions on agency officials performing adjudicative functions.
236
Strauss, supra note __, at 515.
237
Id.
238
See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 300-19
(2002) (discussing the Court’s expansion of its own powers and the increasing lack of
deference it gives the judgments of political actors).
239
See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 149-55, 158 (1991).
240
See Strauss, supra note __, at 508 (describing the formalist worry that “[t]he balance
between concrete gains in efficiency promised by legislative assignments of matters to
agency decision, and the more remote and theoretical benefits of separation of powers, will
never appear to favor the latter in any particular case”); Schor, 478 U.S. at 863 (Brennan, J.,
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special purchase in the area of criminal law, where resource pressures on
the courts and the judicial system make claims of convenience particularly
attractive to judges,241 and where the dangers from relaxing the separation
of powers may seem remote because judges retain considerable oversight
over individual rights in the form of criminal trials. The federal court
system is notoriously overburdened with criminal cases,242 so any proposal
that streamlines the criminal process and results in less criminal work for
the judiciary is bound to have at least surface appeal. And the extensive
protections of the Bill of Rights mean that defendants still receive judicial
oversight. On the surface, then, it might be difficult for judges to see why
that oversight is insufficient and why some relaxation of the separation of
powers is not sensible.243
This is particularly true at this stage of the game, where judges have
become desensitized to a criminal justice system where prosecutors
exercise extensive judicial power,244 as Part IV explains in greater detail.
And, because courts typically analyze separation of powers questions in
regulatory contexts, courts have become accustomed to blending
arrangements in that context and neglect the key differences between
administrative and criminal matters described in Part II. Thus, even a
functional test with bite is likely, at this point in time, to yield the same
underprotection of the judiciary’s role in criminal proceedings.
There is no denying that the formalist approach has shortcomings of
its own. In particular, it might lead to the rejection of useful and
productive government arrangements.245 And if the Court strikes down a
particular practice, Congress and the Executive Branch will likely seek to
dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s functional approach because it “requires that the
legislative interest in convenience and efficiency be weighed against the competing interest
in judicial independence” and thus “pits an interest the benefits of which are immediate,
concrete, and easily understood against one, the benefits of which are almost entirely
prophylactic, and thus often seem remote and not worth the cost in any single case”).
241
See, e.g., Jackie Gardina, Compromising Liberty: A Structural Critique of the
Sentencing Guidelines, 38 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 345, 373 (2005) (noting that the “federal
judiciary is as addicted to plea bargaining as the Department of Justice”).
242
See Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After
Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 840 (1996) (citing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s year-end
reports on the judiciary, the Federal Courts Study Committee, the Judicial Conference, and
the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Long Range Planning as all expressing concern
with the burden criminal cases place on the federal courts).
243
Functionalism is criticized as a general matter because it “calls for a prediction that
cannot accurately be made.” M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of
Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1145 (2000). These concerns are exacerbated in the
criminal context for the reasons stated above.
244
Vermeule, supra note __, at 391 (“Judges, like other people, become habituated to
and invested in the tasks, activities, and procedures they customarily and repetitively
perform.”).
245
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government, supra note __, at 620 (noting that a
functional inquiry has the advantage of “toler[ating] periodic changes in relative political
effectiveness as between President and Congress, Congress and Court, Nation and States”);
Brown, supra note __, at 1526 (stating that formalism “tends to straitjacket the
government’s ability to respond to new needs in creative ways”).
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achieve the same goals through different – though perhaps more costly or
less effective – means.246 But these same costs have been recognized – and
accepted – even in the context of the administrative state, an area in which
efficiency claims have had great sway.247 Although the Court accepted the
New Dealers proposals for a more streamlined government, it did not allow
efficiency values to trump all others. The procedural and structural
safeguards of the APA often impede government action.248 And, of course,
whenever the Court interprets the separation of powers to prevent a
particular government action, that serves as an obstacle to more streamlined
government.249 In those instances, too, there is a risk that the government
finds a way around the process to achieve the same ends.
If the costs have been acceptable in the realm of administrative law –
where the values of convenience and efficiency hold even more sway than
in the criminal context – they should also be accepted when it comes to
criminal justice. At least in the absence of other protections, the costs
associated with separation of powers enforcement are the price for keeping
government abuse in check and ensuring that no one is labeled a criminal
without adequate protection.
B.

Rethinking Morrison and Mistretta

The Court’s decisions in Morrison and Mistretta, as noted, were the
products of a functional analysis that permitted government flexibility. If
the Court had employed a formalist methodology in those cases, the
outcomes and analysis would have changed.250

246

Michael A. Fitts, The Foibles of Formalism: Applying a Political “Transaction
Cost” Analysis to Separation of Powers, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1643, 1648 (1997)
(arguing that political actors can get around formal requirements through informal means).
By way of comparison, Congress responded to Chadha by using alternative measures of
control of the executive, including its power to conduct oversight hearings and its authority
over appropriations. Id. at 1652.
247
Indeed, as Sanford Kadish pointed out, “the common demand [in the early 1940s] for
freedom of the administrator to get on with his job free of the harassment of legal
imperatives is the same demand made today by those who administer the new penology.”
Kadish, supra note __, at 931.
248
Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to
Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 528 (1997) (arguing that judicial and political
review mechanisms have caused the agency “rulemaking process to ‘ossify’ to a disturbing
degree”); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385-86 (1992) (noting that rulemaking has become burdensome
because of judicial oversight).
249
As the Court observed in Chadha, “With all the obvious flaws of delay [and]
untidiness. . ., we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the
exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.”
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S., 919, 959 (1983). See also id. at 944 (“Convenience and efficiency
are not the primary objectives – or the hallmarks – of democratic government. . . .”).
250
The outcome in Hamdi would change as well. But because Hamdi does not involve a
classic criminal law issue in the same way that Morrison and Mistretta do, it is less helpful
for purposes of illustrating how formalism operates in criminal law. Thus, I have omitted
further discussion of Hamdi.
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In Morrison, the more obvious formalist objection to the regime was
the one raised by Justice Scalia in dissent, namely that once prosecutorial
power was deemed executive, Congress could not impose restrictions on
the President’s power of removal. But there is another formalist objection
to the independent counsel regime that also goes to the core of the
separation of powers and the criminal law. In the criminal context, as
noted, the Constitution requires that each branch must exercise independent
judgment to convict. The Ethics in Government Act, however, allowed
Congress to impose pressure on the executive branch to bring an indictment
and limited prosecutorial discretion not to bring charges. The Act imposed
reporting requirements on prosecutors and set up a scheme where it would
be difficult if not impossible for the Attorney General not to appoint an
independent counsel once Congress established evidence showing hints of
criminal activity. And once appointed, the independent counsel retained
the final decision over whether to bring charges. The executive branch lost
its unlimited power not to indict.251 Thus, although usually a criminal
conviction requires the affirmative approval by all branches of government,
the Independent Counsel law diluted the prosecutor’s freedom not to bring
charges, which in turn eliminated one of the Constitution’s protections of
individual liberty. A formalist analysis could therefore strike the law on
either of these theories.252
The result in Mistretta would also change under a formalist analysis.
Justice Scalia pointed out one deficiency – namely the fact that the
Sentencing Commission possessed legislative power outright and not as an
incident to some other executive or judicial function. But there was
another separation of powers shortcoming with the Sentencing Reform Act
that a formalist analysis could have uncovered. As I have explained in
greater detail elsewhere,253 the Sentencing Reform Act operated to transfer
significant discretionary power from the judicial branch, and particularly
the jury, to the Executive Branch and to Congress.254 The Sentencing
Guidelines established under the Sentencing Reform Act, like other
mandatory sentencing laws, dictate a given punishment on the basis of
particular factfindings. These laws operate no differently from general
criminal laws. They define facts that yield punishment.
The Constitution has a carefully calibrated scheme for how laws that
impose criminal punishment are to operate. Specifically, under the
251
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (decision not to indict “has long been
regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch”).
252
And note that functionalism with a thumb on the scale for the interests of defendants
probably would not have changed the outcome. This is evidenced by the fact that even
Rebecca Brown, who explicitly considered whether the independent counsel law threatened
the interests of individuals, concluded that the law should survive a separation of powers
challenge. Brown, supra note__, at 1559.
253
Barkow, supra note __, at 84-102.
254
See also Brown, supra note __, at 1560 (arguing that the Act “placed the bulk of
sentencing decisionmaking in the hands of the prosecutor through a combination of the
charging choices available and the mandatory sentencing laws,” having the effect of
“consolidating in the Executive Branch the power both to prosecute and to sentence”).

BARKOW

SEPTEMBER 7, 2005

48

Constitution, juries must apply those laws because juries act as a critical
check against government overreaching. With their power to nullify, juries
have the discretion to check overbroad laws and ensure that they are
properly applied to a given set of facts.255 The jury provides a critical
check on the legislature and the executive that judges cannot replace in the
context of mandatory sentencing laws.256 But unlike other mandatory
criminal laws that impose punishment, the Guidelines were to be applied
by judges, not juries, and the judges were not given discretion to check
those laws. The Guidelines therefore take constitutional power away from
the judiciary, thereby increasing the power of Congress and the
executive.257
While the Supreme Court has recently identified the threat to the jury
posed by the Sentencing Guidelines258 and other mandatory sentencing
laws that require judges to find facts that increase a defendant’s sentence,259
it still has not seen the problem in separation of powers terms. Instead, the
Court analyzes these laws as interfering only with the defendant’s
individual right to a jury.260 This has led the Court to overlook
constitutional problems with mandatory minimum sentences, 261 and it has
produced a line of cases that lack much in the way of coherence or

255
Barkow, supra note __, at 50-65, 77-84 (describing the constitutional and historical
basis for the jury’s checking function).
256
While the Supreme Court has allowed judges to apply laws that allow for
discretionary sentencing, the same separation-of-powers threat is not raised by those laws
because judges have the requisite discretion to check the executive and legislative branches.
Id. at 70-74. 85. Mandatory laws, in contrast, can be checked only by the nullification
power of the jury. Id. at 85-86; Bruce A. Antkowiak, The Ascent of an Ancient Palladium:
The Resurgent Importance of Trial by Jury and the Coming Revolution in Pennsylvania
Sentencing, 13 WIDENER L.J. 11, 24 (2003) (arguing that judges are incapable of checking
state abuse in the context of crime and punishment because the court’s role is “largely
ministerial, relating facts to elements, and without imposing any further judgment as to the
necessity of such finding”).
257
For a fuller description of the constitutional defects of these laws, see Barkow, supra
note __, at 84-102.
258
United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).
259
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct.
2531 (2004).
260
See, e.g., Apprendi,, 530 U.S. at 476 (noting that the case turned on the Sixth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments).
In Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 296 (1930), the Court determined that the right
to trial by jury was a right of the accused and not part of the structure of government. But
the Court has also recognized the public interest in a jury trial, so it does not allow a
defendant to waive a jury without the consent of the prosecutor and the judge. Id. at 312;
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 38.
261
See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (allowing judges to find facts that
trigger mandatory minimum sentence). See also Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 752. Four of the
Justices (Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg) who found the Sentencing
Guidelines unconstitutional in Booker would also require juries to find facts that trigger
mandatory minimum sentences. Justice Scalia was the fifth vote to strike down the
Guidelines in Booker, but he has upheld mandatory minimum laws applied by judges
without writing an opinion explaining why minimums are different from maximums.
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analysis.262 If the Court had instead viewed the relationship between the
jury and the Sentencing Guidelines through the lens of the separation of
powers, it would have seen that the danger of mandatory sentencing laws is
that they allow the expansion of legislative and executive power without a
sufficient judicial check. That is, the Court would see that the key problem
with these laws is their mandatory nature, not whether they set a floor or
ceiling. Thus, under a formalist analysis that looked to the criminal jury’s
role in the separation of powers, the Court would reject not only those laws
that require judges (not juries) to increase a defendant’s maximum sentence
but also those laws that require judges (not juries) to set a minimum
sentence.263
There is, of course, no guarantee that a formalist analysis would
unearth all the relevant objections, and the fact that the formalist dissents in
Morrison and Mistretta did not highlight these particular failings shows
that it is far from a perfect theory. The Court is likely to miss deficiencies
even under a formalist approach. But even an incomplete formalist
analysis is more likely to correct government overreaching than functional
analysis. After all, even without seeing all the consequences to the
separation of powers posed by the laws at issue in Morrison and Mistretta,
the approach taken by the dissent would have prevented them because it
would have struck the laws at issue. And that is in a very real sense the
point of formalism. It errs on the side of caution and prevents even those
dangers that might not be foreseen. Without other checks serving the same
purpose in the context of crime, that extra protection is worth the cost of
letting some innovations slip away.

262

For a critique of the Court’s approach, see Barkow, supra note __, at 38-44; Rachel
E. Barkow, The Devil You Know: Federal Sentencing After Blakely, 16 Fed. Sent. Rep. 312,
312-313.
263
As it stands now, the only check on state power is the political process itself when
laws mandate minimum sentences. Under the Court’s current approach, for example, a
legislature could make selling crack cocaine a crime punishable by up to life in prison. The
jury would have to find that the defendant did, in fact, sell crack cocaine. But then the
legislature could pass additional laws that set the defendant’s sentencing floor. It could, for
example, pass a law that provides that, if a judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that an individual uses or carries a gun while dealing crack, he gets a mandatory minimum
sentence of 60 years. The potential for state abuse here should be apparent. Who gets
charged with this law will be entirely at the discretion of prosecutors. And as long as there
is enough evidence to pass the preponderance standard, the judge must give this sentence.
No judicial actor has the discretion to ignore the law in a given case if justice would require
it. Indeed, the jury check is so anemic that the jury could acquit the defendant of possessing
a gun and the defendant is still subject to the mandatory minimum sentence as long as the
judge makes the requisite finding.
To be sure, even if the jury were to apply these laws, the check is imperfect because the
jury is not told of the mandatory sentence. Whether a prohibition on the defendant’s ability
to instruct the jury on a mandatory sentence also violates the separation of powers and jury
guarantee is beyond the scope of this paper. But for an argument along those lines, see
Kristin K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About Mandatory
Sentencing Consequences, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1249 (1995).
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IV.

SEPARATION OF POWERS AND PLEA BARGAINING

While the importance of the issues in Morrison and Mistretta cannot
be discounted, a different outcome in those cases would not necessarily
lead to significant changes in federal criminal law and practice. The
independent counsel law has expired, and the sentencing commission’s
authority has been undermined by the Court’s Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. But that does not mean that the analysis
suggested here has little practical import. On the contrary, taking a
formalist approach to separation of powers would call into question
existing plea bargaining practices.264 This section will explore the threat
that current plea bargaining practices pose to the constitutional order.
Though a full analysis of the implications and possible resolution of the
issue requires separate study, merely highlighting the issues demonstrates
that important questions have been unasked and unanswered by the Court’s
criminal law jurisprudence.
Today, plea bargaining is the only process that more than 95% of
criminal defendants in the federal system receive.265 Defendants argue the
merits of their case before prosecutors, who then decide the charges of
which the defendant is guilty.266
For most of the nation’s history, plea bargaining existed as an
underground practice.267 It was not until the Santobello268 decision in 1971
that the Supreme Court acknowledged and accepted plea bargaining as
legitimate,269 largely on the grounds of convenience.270 The Court reasoned
264

It would also, as noted above and explored in greater detail in Barkow, supra note
__, change the Court’s analysis of mandatory minimum sentences.
265
In 2003, 95.7% of cases in the federal system were settled by guilty pleas. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, at Figure C
(2004). Available at: http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2003/Fig-c.PDF.
266
Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading Off?,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1403-1404 (2003) (“Most plea negotiations, in fact, are primarily
discussions of the merits of the case, in which defense attorneys point out legal, evidentiary,
or practical weaknesses in the prosecutor’s case, or mitigating circumstances that merit
mercy…” made “to a prosecutor, who assesses their factual accuracy and likely
persuasiveness to a hypothetical judge or jury, and then decides the charge of which the
defendant should be adjudged guilty.”); Plea Bargaining, 84 HARV. L. REV. 148, 151 (1970)
(noting that there are “few safeguards” in this process, as “[t]he prosecutor’s job does not
require him to be assured of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”).
267
For excellent historical overviews of plea bargaining, see GEORGE FISCHER, PLEA
BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH (2003); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979): Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical
Perspective, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 247 (1979); John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short
History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261 (1979).
268
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
269
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977) (noting that, “[f]or decades [plea
bargaining] was a sub rosa process shrouded in secrecy and deliberately concealed by
participating defendants, defense lawyers, prosecutors and even judges” and that it “was not
until [the Court’s] decision in Santobello that lingering doubts about the legitimacy of the
practice were finally dispelled”).
270
The Court has highlighted other benefits of plea bargaining, but they also boil down
to convenience claims. According to the Court, defendants get the benefit of less pretrial
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that plea bargaining had become “an essential component of the
administration of justice” and noted that “[i]f every criminal charge were
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would
need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court
facilities.”271 To avoid burdening the system, the Court stated that plea
bargaining should be “encouraged.”272 The Court has acknowledged “that,
by tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has
necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that
the prosecutor’s interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant
to forgo his right to plead not guilty.”273
Thus, in a departure from its unconstitutional conditions
jurisprudence,274 the Court allows prosecutors to condition sentencing or
charging deals on the waiver of constitutional trial rights.275 Prosecutors
incarceration, a speedier disposition, avoidance of the uncertainty of the trial outcome, and
“a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Blackledge,
431 U.S. at 71. “The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with
criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal
proceedings.” Id.
271
404 U.S. at 260. See also id. at 264 (Douglas, J., concurring) (plea bargains “serve
an important role in the disposition of today’s heavy calendars”).
272
Id.
273
Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 221 (1978). This is codified in the sentencing
guidelines, which allow up to a three-level deduction for defendants who plead guilty,
Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1(b)(2), and up to a four-level deduction for defendants who plead
in fast-track jurisdictions, id. § 5K3.1.
274
The Supreme Court has rejected government attempts to condition the receipt of
other government benefits on the relinquishment of constitutional rights on the theory that
“[i]t would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, by
words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal
Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise
of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens
otherwise to withhold.” Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94
(1926). For an insightful discussion of how the waiver of criminal trial rights differs from
the waiver of other constitutional rights, see Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 801, 804-45 (2003) (explaining that the there is a general presumption against
the government’s ability to condition benefits on the waiver of constitutional rights other
than criminal process rights, where the presumption is that those rights are subject to
bargaining); Loftus E. Becker, Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court, 21 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 757, 776-94, 829-32 (1988) (noting that plea bargaining is treated sui generis by the
Court and is inconsistent with the treatment of compelled confessions and conditions on
other constitutional rights). For a sampling of unconstitutional conditions cases, see, e.g.,
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (rejecting as unconstitutional the discharge of state
employees on the basis of party affiliation); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(holding unconstitutional the conditioning of welfare benefits on a residency requirement);
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (disallowing the conditioning of
building permits on the granting of an easement to the public).
275
United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995) (noting that defendants can
waive in plea agreements, among other things, double jeopardy defense, privilege against
self-incriminations, right to jury trial, and the right to confrontation). Under “ancient
doctrine . . . the accused could waive nothing.” Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 307
(1930) (internal quotations and citation omitted). According to the Court, this was based on
the fear that innocent defendants might be convicted because of process deficiencies. Id.
While the Court concluded in Patton that the fears were no longer justified in light of trial
protections, a system that is dominated by plea bargaining runs the same risk of innocent
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can obtain plea agreements by threatening criminal defendants with longer
sentences or additional charges if they exercise their right to trial.276 The
plea must be knowing and voluntary,277 so courts review pleas to check that
they are not the result of threats of force or promises or threats that are
outside the plea agreement itself.278 But otherwise, prosecutors are free to
condition significant sentence and charge reductions on the waiver of
judicial process as long as there is a factual basis for the plea.279 For
example, the Supreme Court concluded it was lawful for a prosecutor to
offer to recommend a five-year sentence if a defendant pleaded guilty but
to threaten to bring charges subjecting the defendant to a mandatory life
sentence if he did not.280
Although many scholars have criticized plea bargaining on a number
of grounds,281 they have largely ignored the separation of powers analysis.
defendants pleading guilty. See Ronald F. Wright, The End of Innocence in Federal
Criminal Justice 7 (observing that acquittal rates have dropped over the last thirty years as
guilty pleas have increased), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=702901.
276
The Court has also accepted statutory schemes where a defendant faces a greater
penalty after a jury trial. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (holding that a
defendant’s plea was not involuntary where a defendant avoided the risk of the death
penalty under the statute by pleading guilty and avoiding a jury trial).
277
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (noting that the “longstanding test for
determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and
intelligent choice”).
278
FED .R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(1). The judge also sees if there is a factual basis for the plea.
Id. See also Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312 (2nd Cir. 1988) (noting that a plea is valid
“if it is not the product of actual or threatened physical harm, mental coercion overbearing
the defendant’s will, or the defendant’s sheer inability to weigh his options rationally”).
279
Defendants in federal court who waive their right to a jury trial receive, on average, a
300 percent reduction in their sentence. Jackie Gardina, Compromising Liberty: A
Structural Critique of the Sentencing Guidelines, 38 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 345, 348
(2005).
280
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978). The Court reasoned that “in the
‘give-and-take’ of plea bargaining, there is no . . . element of punishment or retaliation so
long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution’s offer.” Id. at 363. This
varies from the court’s treatment of increased sentences following a conviction after a
retrial. In that context, a judge can give a longer sentence after a new trial only based upon
“objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant
occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.” Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,
412 U.S. 17, 25 (1973) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court adopted this
rule so that defendants would not be deterred from raising their rights on appeal because of
fear of retaliation. Id.
281
See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 1219 (comparing plea bargaining to medieval European torture and noting that the “sentencing
differential is what makes plea bargaining coercive”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1985-91 (1992) (highlighting numerous flaws
with plea bargaining, including the conflicts of interest of counsel and the pressure it puts on
innocent defendants to plead, which causes negative externalities on society). Other
scholars defend plea bargaining on the basis that individuals – even those who are innocent
of the charges against them – should have the right to waive trial and get a discounted
sentence. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1909, 1968 (1992) (arguing that plea bargaining should be treated like other contractual
arrangements and regulated accordingly); Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as
Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1978 (1992) (arguing that plea bargaining is efficient and
based on defendant’s autonomy). One scholar who has noted the separation-of-powers
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But the dangers of plea bargaining come into full relief when approached in
this manner. Prosecutors use the judicial process – the very means of
checking the prosecutor and Congress – as the key bargaining chip in
negotiations. In the classic plea bargaining scenario, if a defendant elects
to go to trial, he or she faces a longer sentence and more charges. If the
prosecutor charged a defendant $20,000 for going to trial but there was no
charge if the defendant pleaded guilty, it would seem obvious that the
bargain was unconstitutional. Yet when prosecutors put a different – in
some cases, far more costly price – on going to trial, it is currently
considered acceptable.
With this bargaining chip in hand, it is not surprising that almost all
cases result in plea bargains. With the ability to put a price tag on trial, the
prosecutor becomes a cheaper adjudicator for the defendant, combining
both executive and judicial power and posing the very danger the Framers
tried to prevent.282 If there were institutional and procedural checks on the
prosecutor as there are for other administrative actors, perhaps this would
not be so troubling.283 But as Part II explained, these protections are absent
in the plea bargaining context. As a result, the prosecutor acts with
discretion that is almost unmatched anywhere in law.
The real question in a plea bargained case, then, should not be whether
the plea of any individual defendant is voluntary or knowing, but whether
concerns is Donald Dripps, who recently observed that “the actual practice of plea
bargaining poses a still worse separation-of-powers problem. For if the prosecutor
dominates plea bargaining, and plea bargaining simply is the criminal justice process, the
real trial is the one, quite informal and necessarily based mostly on hearsay, at which the
prosecutor decides what charges to file and what plea to accept.” Donald A. Dripps,
Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 1155,1156 (2005). For an analysis of the jury’s role in the system of separated
powers, see Barkow, supra note __, at 46-65. See also Gardina, supra note __, at 386-88.
282
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (“Were [the power of judging] joined to the executive
power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.”); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 78 (“[L]iberty . . . would have everything to fear from [the judiciary’s] union with either
of the other departments.”). As a plurality of the Court recently noted in Hamdi, “[t]hat
even purportedly fair adjudicators ‘are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be
decided is, of course, the general rule.’” Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2651 (citing Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927)). See also id .at 2655 (“In a government of separated powers, deciding
finally on what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or
some condition in between) is not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government,
whose particular responsibility is to maintain security.”) (Souter, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
283
Judge Lynch notes that imposing formal administrative law rules on prosecutors’
offices “would vastly increase the complexity and expense of the prosecutorial agency.” Id.
at 2145. He therefore proposes some modest changes to the current process, namely greater
discovery rights for defendants and the right of a defendant to present his or her case to a
supervising prosecutor. Id. at 2147-49. While these changes would be an improvement
over the current process and are well worth further inquiry, it is not clear why a more
complete range of administrative law rules should not apply to prosecutors. Additional
processes always require some costs. The real question is whether the benefits outweigh the
costs, and there is no reason for believing that the calculus is different for prosecutors than
for any other agency. On the contrary, because of the liberty interests at stake in criminal
proceedings, one would think the price of additional process is well worth it.
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there is a sufficient check on prosecutors’ use of the bargaining power. If
the Court focused on the structural relationship among branches instead of
on individual defendants, it would see there is currently no check at all.
Prosecutors have unbridled discretion to make or not make these deals in
any given cases. But this is the kind of unbridled discretionary power that
the separation of powers is supposed to prevent.284 If prosecutors can put a
higher price on judicial oversight, the state can selectively target groups
and individuals for prosecution in a manner that avoids both political and
judicial oversight.285 The political process will not work because the vast
majority of people will be unaffected and will not mobilize to fight against
the practice. And the judicial process will not work if the only question in
a given case is whether the individual defendant before the Court made the
deal knowingly and voluntarily.286 The Framers recognized dangers such
as this and required a strong judicial role in criminal cases to prevent it. A
system where upwards of 95% cases never go to trial and where
prosecutors make all the key judgments does not fit comfortably with the
separation of powers.
What does the separation of powers require? While a full analysis is
beyond the scope of this Article, it would seem to prohibit a system of plea
bargains and agreements in which the judicial process is used as a
bargaining chip for leverage that undercuts the judicial role – at least under
the current scheme of unregulated prosecutorial discretion. Specifically,
prosecutors should not be allowed to threaten individuals with more
charges or longer sentences if they go to trial or, put differently, to offer
discounts of shorter sentences or fewer charges if a defendant pleads guilty.
Trial should not be part of the bargain. This would not stop judges from
using their discretion to give sentencing breaks if a defendant pleads guilty
and accepts responsibility. But that power should rest with them, not
prosecutors. Because the only power the accused has vis-à-vis the state is
the power to go to court, and the only way society knows whether criminal
proceedings are working properly is if they are conducted in the open,
before a judicial actor.
There are two serious objections to this analysis. The first involves
what can be called the inevitability of plea bargaining. Even if plea
agreements are deemed unconstitutional, that will not take away
prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutors would retain the freedom to charge

284

“When it comes to law execution, the genius of the separation of powers is that,
typically, two branches must independently conclude that some party has violated the law
before anyone is punished. The benefit is clearly absent when the executive and judiciary
are one and the same.” Prakash, supra note __, at 1728 n.147.
285
Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J.
399, 426-27 (2001) (pointing out that selective enforcement of the laws by the executive
branch poses the same threat that the Ex Post Facto Clause is designed to prevent when it is
done through legislative action).
286
Unless, of course, voluntary is given more bite and forms the basis for the analysis
suggested here.
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or not charge a defendant,287 and because a defendant’s act usually violates
more than one statute, to choose from among various possible charges.288
The key difference would be that prosecutors could not make that decision
in an explicit bargain with the defendant. In light of that power, it might be
reasonable to expect plea bargaining to continue, but under the sub rosa
regime that existed before the Court accepted the practice in the early
1970s.289 The concern, then, is that plea bargaining would continue, but
there would be insignificant oversight because it would take place
underground and it would be hard to distinguish bargained guilty pleas
from guilty pleas made without deals.
As an initial matter, it is important to reemphasize how little oversight
takes place now, with plea bargaining existing as an overt practice. Judges
do not scrutinize pleas. Instead, the judicial inquiry is typically a cursory
look at whether the defendant made the deal knowingly and voluntarily.
The loss of judicial review over bargains would therefore be slight because
judicial review itself is slight.
Moreover, the loss of the minimal judicial review that currently exists
seems outweighed by the fact that undoubtedly the number of plea bargains
would decrease if plea bargaining is declared a violation of the separation
of powers. If prosecutors and defense lawyers are told that this practice is
unlawful, many should be deterred from engaging in it on ethical grounds.
In addition, some jurisdictions have experimented with plea bargaining
bans, lending further support to the notion that much plea bargaining can be
limited.290
The second major objection to finding plea bargaining to be a
violation of separation of powers is a practical one. The concern here is
that the system will be overwhelmed by trials and will not be able to
function. While undoubtedly a greater drain will be placed on the system,
it is not at all clear that the system will approach anything close to collapse.
First, because the separation of powers argument only applies to the federal
government, the claim here applies only to the federal government.291 It is
287

See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (acknowledging the
prosecutor’s discretion to decide what charges to bring).
288
See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (noting that whether to
prosecute and what charges to bring “are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor’s
discretion”).
289
By openly acknowledging the existence of plea bargaining, the Court imposed
minimal regulations on it. It required access to counsel during the negotiations, the need for
a showing that the plea was knowing and voluntary, and that the prosecutor keep whatever
promises were made. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 362.
290
The results in these jurisdictions have been mixed. Compare Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad
Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 707-09 (2001) (discussing bans on negotiated
pleas in Alaska, California, El Paso, Texas, and Maricopa County, Arizona that did not
eliminate plea bargaining) with Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1050-87 (1984) (describing the bench trial system used in Philadelphia
that serves as a feasible alternative to plea bargaining).
291
See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902) (“Whether the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers of a state shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether
persons or collections of persons belonging to one department may, in respect to some
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a matter of state, not federal, constitutional law whether the same
infirmities exist in the state system. And while the states themselves have
also shown a commitment to the separation of powers,292 the arguments for
using formalist reasoning to interpret the Constitution might not apply at
the state level.293 Moreover, even assuming that some states followed the
lead of the federal courts and interpreted state constitutions with separation
of powers provisions to ban plea bargaining, state constitutions are more
easily amended than the federal Constitution..294 So, states could change
their constitutions if they decide that plea bargaining is crucial to the
functioning of their criminal justice system.
But what about the drain on the federal system? First, it is not
necessarily true that federal expenditures on criminal enforcement would
increase dramatically in the absence of plea bargaining. Instead, if the
federal government must internalize the costs of constitutional procedures,
it might be less likely to federalize so many crimes in the first place. It is a
common criticism that there are too many federal criminal laws that serve
no purpose other than to duplicate state laws for political posturing.295 If
federal prosecution becomes more costly, it would create incentives for
Congress and prosecutors to be more selective in the use of federal
resources.296 Enforcing separation of powers would therefore serve
federalism values.297

matters, exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of government,
is for the determination of the state.”); Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering
Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167,
1188 (1999) (“[T]he U.S. Constitution fails to dictate a specific form of separation of
powers for state governments.”).
292
Rossi, supra note __, at 1190-91 (noting that the “[s]eparation of powers is a
bedrock principle to the constitutions of each of the fifty states” and that “[t]he
overwhelming majority of modern state constitutions contain a strict separation of powers
clause”).
293
See id. at 1218-22 (noting similarities and difference in state and federal interpretive
approaches).
294
See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note __, at 430 (noting the frequency with which states
amend their constitutions and citing as examples South Carolina’s use of seven different
constitutions with 474 amendments, California’s 493 amendments, and Alabama’s 618
constitutional amendments).
295
Barkow, supra note __, at 104-05. See also Ashdown, supra note __, at 802
(criticizing the fact that many of the more than 3,000 federal crimes cover conduct
prosecutable under state law).
296
Although it is also possible that Congress and prosecutors will try to save resources
in other ways – such as by streamlining the trial process, see Scott & Stuntz, supra note __,
at 1950 (arguing that abolition in plea bargaining would lead to a truncated trial process) –
Article III and the Bill of Rights will set outer limits on what can be done.
297
This argument has parallels to Brad Clark’s claim that the separation of powers, by
making it more difficult to enact federal laws, serves the values of federalism. Bradford R.
Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1324,
1339-1341 (2001). The Constitution imposes certain costs on federal criminal enforcement
through the separation of powers and the judicial process that protect not only the interests
of individuals but the values of federalism as well.
For arguments in favor of limited federal jurisdiction over crime, see Barkow, supra
note __, at 103-06.
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Second, the increased costs are in a very real sense the point.298
Federal criminal enforcement should be expensive enough that the
government has to think about where and when to use it. Because if it
comes cheaply, it will come too often and the political process will be
unable to stop it. One need look no further than the current incarceration
rates for evidence of this phenomenon. As plea bargaining has increased,
so have the incarceration rates. It seems to be more than a coincidence that
this rate correlates with a plea bargaining process that combines the
efficiency of the administrative model with none of the checks.
While it might seem radical to suggest putting a brake on this
dynamic, that is only because plea bargaining has grown so familiar in the
absence of an analysis under the separation of powers. But a return to first
principles – to the very reasons why we bother separating power in the first
place – shows that this familiarity does not make the current system sound.
On the contrary, it is a system with a dangerous aggregation of power in the
hands of front line federal prosecutors that is vested in them by Congress.
If the federal government is sufficiently concerned that the system the
Framers established has become too dangerous and too costly, then it could
fix it by amending the Constitution to allow plea bargains or bench trials or
some other streamlined system. But the Framers had the foresight to set
the default rules to protect minority interests that could be subject to abuse
by political majorities.299 At the very least, we should have to think long
and hard before we abolish that system in the name of convenience.300
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence has been
criticized on any number of grounds. But what has been overlooked is its
blanket approach to these questions without attention to the differences in
substantive categories. Crime, in particular, raises concerns distinct from
those present in matters associated with the oversight of the administrative
state. Because the government does not face the same structural,
298

Note that the costs of constitutional rights have been accepted outside the area of
criminal process rights, where the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not allow
arguments of efficiency and convenience to trump the interests of the constitutional rights in
question. Mazzone, supra note __, at 849.
299
The separation of powers works in this regard like a strong canon of construction. It
forces political actors to overcome a large hurdle before dismantling the existing rightsprotecting framework.
300
It could be argued that a middle ground is possible that would allow some plea
bargaining as long as there is sufficient oversight by the judiciary. See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz,
supra note __, at 1930-31, 1959-60 (arguing for more intense judicial scrutiny of plea
bargaining outcomes). Just as the administrative state satisfies the separation of powers
analysis with its various mechanisms for judicial and political oversight, plea bargaining
could also coexist with the Constitution’s requirements as long as it was sufficiently
regulated. It is beyond the scope of this Article what arrangements might suffice for that
purpose, though that is certainly an avenue worth pursuing. What is clear is that the
unregulated system of plea bargaining that exists today cannot be squared with separation of
powers.
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institutional, and political checks when it proceeds criminally as when it
proceeds in a civil regulatory action, the Constitution’s separation of
powers takes on greater significance in the criminal context because it
provides the only effective check on systemic government overreaching.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court and scholars have overlooked the
importance of separation of powers in the criminal context. The result has
been a flexible approach to governmental blending of powers that has
allowed innovations like the independent counsel law and the Sentencing
Guidelines, as well as a pervasive system of plea bargaining in which
prosecutors operate virtually unchecked. Without strong enforcement of
the separation of powers or other institutional checks to take its place, the
government thus faces far less oversight when it proceeds in a criminal
matter than in a regulatory one.
Greater enforcement of the Constitution’s separation of powers would
prevent this perverse state of affairs. It would require Congress and the
executive branch to internalize the costs of the Constitution’s judicial
protections in making their decisions, thus replacing the current system in
which they are free to pressure defendants to forego judicial process. It
would restore the checking function of judges and juries and would require
that all the key players – Congress, the executive, judges, and juries – agree
before an individual is convicted of a federal offense. At the same time,
greater enforcement of the separation of powers would still give Congress
the freedom to adapt and adjust substantive criminal laws and sentences as
it sees fit.301 In addition, the formalist approach to the separation of powers
advocated here has the virtue of having proven itself to be a viable
methodology. The Court has already used it in many administrative
contexts other than crime. There is all the more reason to use it in the
criminal context, where the stakes are higher and the potential for abuse is
so much greater.

301
Congress’ power is subject, of course, to constitutional limits, such as the Eighth
Amendment and jurisdictional requirements.

